Popular culture is a spontaneous and instantaneous manifestation of how the public feels. As such it can have a direct bearing on politics and on shaping the state of affairs. This is especially the case when there is a rapid and momentous development of events, e.g. with the 2011 Egyptian revolution. The reaction of the Obama administration received much popular reaction because of its fluctuating responses, wavering between support for the regime and the U.S. political interests on the one hand, and gaining the trust and faith of the Egyptian youth, thereby feeding into its idealistic image as the epitome of freedom and democracy. Naturally, the youth who instigated the revolution expected the Obama administration to legitimize its position on the side of the people and act as an outside pressure force that would help them fight their battle and realize their dreams. However, the response of the Obama administration was both insipid and frustrating, and the Tahrir youth made it the butt of their censure. Ironically, the U.S. position was so ambiguous that it did not manage to please the regime either, and was simultaneously perceived as having forfeited the support it has unconditionally provided the Egyptian government throughout the past thirty years of Mubarak’s reign. In this paper, I offer a reading of people’s criticism of the ambiguous position of the U.S. as manifested in jokes, songs, slogans, and graffiti that directly targeted the U.S. and exposed its shortcomings. The analysis will highlight the tripartite relationship: U.S. political rhetoric, official Egyptian response, and Egyptian public reaction (as expressed through the above media), shedding light on how the latter in targeting either of the first two often also directly impacts the other.