This paper will discuss some overlooked implications of the US military’s embrace of counterinsurgency doctrine (COIN) in Iraq and Afghanistan and the current plans to extend this strategic approach elsewhere in the Middle East and elsewhere. This new military and strategic approach has been heavily marketed as a turn towards winning the “hearts and minds” of a population through understanding local culture, providing security and raising the quality of life as opposed to using direct force and violence to defeat an insurgency. By contrast, this paper will argue that the US military’s alleged emphasis on building up life in reality has been largely secondary to a revolution in the focused application of violence and death through the development of new networked warfare strategies that seek to “disappear” the overt use of violence from both domestic American and target country public scrutiny. The paper will show how the US military’s 2007 “surge” counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq was far less interested in building up Iraqi life than it was with creating a new environment for the focused and largely hidden application of violence through new networked, often unmanned and computerized lethal special operations killing networks (JSOC) which have subsequently been extended to Afghanistan and elsewhere. The paper will conclude with a discussion of the relevance of recent political theory by such thinkers as Georgio Agamben and Hardt and Negri to understand how the stated concern for life embraced in COIN (biopolitics) is at the same time reinscribed through strategies of power that conceal violence and death.