Lawfare and Armed Conflict:
Comparing Israeli and US Targeted Killing Policies and Challenges Against Them

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Executive Summary

The term lawfare, an amalgamation of “law” and “warfare,” is used in reference to various kinds of legal challenges to state policies and practices in the realm of national security. Unsurprisingly, it has a negative connotation among those who oppose efforts to legally constrain state prerogatives, to fetter the discretion of officials in their pursuit of national security goals, and to pursue accountability for violations. This article engages the concept of lawfare to focus comparatively on legal contestations over Israeli and US policies and practices in their twenty-first century armed conflicts, the second intifada and the global “war on terror,” respectively. Part I traces the contemporary relationship between law and conflict, and political debates arising from these developments. In order to name a phenomenon integral to evolving uses of law, I use “state lawfare” to describe the ways in which government officials construct interpretative edifices to project the lawfulness of policies that deviate from international interpretations of international humanitarian law (IHL). Part II focuses on state lawfare efforts by both governments to assert the legality of their targeted killing policies. Part III addresses legal challenges to Israeli and US targeted killing as exemplary of lawfare.
Introduction

“Lawfare” was coined at the turn of this century to describe the expanding role of law in relation to warfare. Examples of this expansion include the establishment of United Nations ad hoc tribunals to prosecute perpetrators of war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity in the former Yugoslavia (1993) and Rwanda (1994); the passage of a treaty to establish an International Criminal Court (1998); and the “Pinochet precedent” (1999) which signaled a new shelf-life for the doctrine of universal jurisdiction to prosecute people accused of core crimes under international law in foreign national courts.

Despite a lack of unanimity over the term’s meaning, these days lawfare most commonly is invoked in reference to various kinds of legal challenges to state policies and practices in the realm of national security. Unsurprisingly, it has a negative connotation among those who oppose efforts to legally constrain state prerogatives, to fetter the discretion of officials in their pursuit of national security goals, and to pursue accountability for violations.

This article engages the concept of lawfare to focus comparatively on legal contestations over Israeli and US policies and practices in their respective twenty-first century armed conflicts. Part I traces the contemporary relationship between law and conflict, and political debates arising from these developments. In order to name a phenomenon integral to evolving uses of law, I use “state lawfare” to describe the ways in which government officials construct interpretative edifices to project the lawfulness of policies that deviate from international interpretations of international humanitarian law (IHL). Part II focuses on state lawfare efforts by both governments to assert the legality of their targeted killing policies. Part III addresses legal challenges to Israeli and US targeted killing as exemplary of lawfare.

2 For example, the Lawfare blog (www.lawfareblog.com), established in 2010, has become a popular cyber-venue for interventions and debates about “hard national security choices” (its subtitle).
3 This article extends the comparative analysis of Israeli and US efforts to “legalize” torture in Lisa Hajjar, “International Humanitarian Law and ‘Wars on Terror’: A Comparative Analysis of Israeli and American Doctrines and Policies,” Journal of Palestine Studies 36/1 (Autumn 2006).
1. Lawfare and State Lawfare

A. The Lawfare Concept

Credit for the coinage of *lawfare* often is attributed to a 2001 essay by Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., who defined it as “the use of law as a weapon of war” and “a method of warfare where law is used as a means of realizing a military objective.” Dunlap penned that essay when he was an active duty US Air Force colonel and Staff Judge Advocate, and imbued the term with a military-centric and negative meaning. Using the examples of the 1991 Gulf War and the NATO intervention in Kosovo, he argued that the elevated role for military lawyers to approve targeting decisions was a manifestation of “hyperlegalism.” This intensifying desire to avoid violations (e.g., deliberately targeting civilians or the use of disproportionate force) was responsive to media technologies capable of conveying the consequences of combat in almost-real time, and the efficacy of humanitarian organizations to analyze those consequences against the standards of international law. Dunlap worried that *lawfare*—using information about violations—could have a constraining effect on the US military by undermining public support for warfare. He writes: “Evidence shows this technique can work. The Vietnam War—where US forces never suffered a true military defeat—is the model that today’s adversaries repeatedly try to replicate.”

Dunlap has remained a ubiquitous interlocutor in discussions and debates about lawfare. But he has since reconsidered the negative connotation he attached to the term. He has come to believe that “concern by publics, NGOs, academics, legislatures, and the courts about the behavior of militaries is more than a mere public relations problem; it is a legitimate and serious activity totally consistent with adherence to the rule of law, democratic values, and—for that matter—lawfare…[T]he use of the courts is something I advocate as a vitally important lawfare measure.”

Dunlap’s original negative connotation remains popular among those who oppose the trending hyperlegalism. For example, in March 2003 the Council on Foreign Relations convened a National Security Roundtable titled “Lawfare, the Latest in Asymmetries” to discuss “the increased use of legal tools to combat American military might,” and the “widening gap between the legal culture in the United States and Europe.” A bolder excoriation appears in the 2005 National Security Strategy of the United States which asserts: “Our strength as a nation-state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes and terrorism.”

Israeli officials and supporters of the state’s military ventures in Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon deploy the term *lawfare* to decry criticisms of Israeli violations and efforts to hold individuals accountable for alleged war crimes. They charge that lawfare is one manifestation of an international campaign to “delegitimize” Israel, in the same despicable

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6 Dunlap Law and Military Interventions, 11 (emphasis in original).
11 That posture was explicit at a March 2010 conference organized by the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations and hosted at the New York County Lawyers Association. According to Scott Horton, “Speakers repeatedly characterized the [UN Goldstone] report as an attack on Israel’s right to exist and ignored the fact that it reserved its sharpest criticism for the conduct of Palestinian militants. …The specific factual conclusions of the report were not discussed, however. Typical was Columbia Law Dean David Schizer,…who concluded that the Goldstone report ‘created standards of morality in war that leave a state without the means of legitimate self-protection,’ without offering any explanation as to how he got there. …The principal question was strategic, namely, how best to disarm critics of the Israeli Government’s security policies.” Scott Horton, “Lawfare Redux,” Harper’s Magazine, March 12, 2010, available at http://www.harpers.org/archive/2010/03/hbc-90006694.
company with BDS (the boycott, divestment and sanctions movement), and that it poses a “strategic threat.”

The Lawfare Project, established in 2010 to defend US and Israeli governmental interests from critics, has a banner at the top of its website home page that proclaims: “Lawfare is an increasingly emergent form of asymmetric warfare, which must be countered both tactically and strategically.” At the Project’s inaugural conference, former US ambassador to the UN John Bolton, said,

“It is a big mistake for us to grant any validity to international law even when it may seem in our short-term interest to do so—because over the long term…those who think that international law really means anything are those who want to constrict the United States.”

The Lawfare Project defines the term and its dangerousness as: “the use of the law as a weapon of war,” or, more specifically, the abuse of the law and judicial systems to achieve strategic military or political ends. It consists of the negative manipulation of international and national human rights laws to accomplish purposes other than, or contrary to, those for which they were originally enacted. Modern-day lawfare has three goals: 1) to silence and punish free speech about issues of national security and public concern; 2) to delegitimize the sovereignty of democratic states; and 3) to frustrate and hinder the ability of democracies to fight against and defeat terrorism.

According to its mission statement, the Lawfare Project’s “primary goals” include facilitation of “(legal and non-legal) responses to the perversion and misapplication of international [and] national human rights law,” identifying “potential lawfare threats,” and mobilizing “human and institutional resources to combat them.”


13 http://www.thelawfareproject.org/.

14 A video of The Lawfare Project conference is available at http://www.youtube.com/user/TheLawfareProject.

15 Horton, “Lawfare Redux.”
B. State Lawfare

Despite contemporary remonstrations about the misapplication and manipulation of international law, Israeli officials pioneered what I term state lawfare. Rather than ignoring inconvenient international laws, they forged original (i.e., international consensus-defying) interpretations to project the legality of state practices. In June 1967 when Israel conquered the West Bank and Gaza, officials accepted the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV), the main body of IHL that pertains to militarily occupied territories and their civilian population (who are designated “protected persons”). One month later, however, a decision was taken to reject de jure applicability on the grounds that the West Bank and Gaza were not “occupied” because they were not sovereign to the states displaced in the war (i.e., Jordan and Egypt). Rather, their status was sui generis, and thus Israel was not bound by GCIV in areas “administered” by the military.

Although this interpretation never obtained international credibility, it became the cornerstone of Israel’s doctrine on the state’s rights within these territories, and the limited rights of Palestinians who reside there. On top of the claim that these territories were administered rather than occupied, other state lawfare premises were piled, such as the contention that international human rights laws ratified by Israel are inapplicable to the treatment of “foreign” people in areas administered by but not sovereign to the state.

In 1968, to reinforce the claim that Israel’s administration of the West Bank and Gaza was benign, the attorney general granted Palestinians the option to petition the High Court of Justice (HCJ). Over the decades, thousands of petitions challenging the legality of state practices have been filed. Such petitioning raises two debated issues: First, does the process of appealing to Israel’s HCJ lend legitimacy to the occupation? Second, have the rights of petitioners been vindicated and protected in the judicial outcomes? In regard to the first, Hassan Jabareen writes:

[Legal advocacy…has not led Palestinians, or people around the world, to consider the occupation lawful….]

[T]he claim that legal advocacy in oppressive regimes legitimates the oppression in the eyes of the victims or the international community exaggerates the force of persuasion of these regimes and attributes more weight to the legal profession than it actually carries.

In regard to the second issue, the cumulative outcome of this litigation has not been favorable to Palestinian petitioners. On the contrary, with rare exceptions, HCJ decisions have sanctioned state practices and reinforced the state lawfare premises underlying them. The judicial record, as Nimer Sultany describes it, is oppression-blind jurisprudence, concealment of the general context, fragmentation of reality, the practice of non-intervention and submission to dubious “security” considerations disguised rhetorically by “balancing” and “proportionality” tests, and declining to provide meaningful and timely legal remedies.

What, then, is the point of going to court? Jabareen locates the value of litigation in a transnational and political context to argue that even when petitioners lose, taking cases to court functions as a means of exposing the contents and rationales of the state’s positions, and the nature of oppression and discrimination.

16 For an elaboration of these issues, see Chapters 1 and 2 of Lisa Hajjar, Courting Conflict: The Israeli Military Court System in the West Bank and Gaza (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).


18 For example, in 1987, forty percent of all petitions to the HCJ were filed by Palestinians. Hassan Jabareen, “On Legal Advocacy and Legitimation of Control,” Jadal 13 (May 2012), 2.


C. State Lawfare and Armed Conflict in the Twenty-first Century

Israeli state lawfare took a new course in the 1990s as a result of political changes resulting from the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. While the Oslo Accords did not end the occupation, military redeployment from Palestinian population centers (Areas A) and the establishment of a Palestinian Authority (PA) prompted Israel to modify its position on the legal status of the West Bank and Gaza. Officials asserted that areas under the semi-autonomous control of the PA had become differently "foreign." This became highly significant following the breakdown of negotiations in July 2000 and the start of a second intifada in September.

The triggering event, although by no means the underlying cause, was Likud Party candidate for prime minister Ariel Sharon's provocative visit with 1,000 armed guards to the Haram al-Sharif on September 28. Palestinians demonstrated in protest, and the following day seven were killed. Rema Hammami and Salim Tamari describe how the second intifada detonated almost immediately into armed conflict:

Unlike the first intifada, [in 2000 there were] about 40,000 Palestinian police and security men under arms. Their presence allows, among other things, for easier justification of Israeli use of military force, despite the fact that [Palestinian] security forces were involved in clashes in only a very few cases. The much-touted Fatah tanzim—a murky designation that includes Fatah street cadre and elements of the Preventative Security Force—has undertaken the majority of armed actions.

Israel characterized spreading protests as acts of aggression, loosened the military’s rules of engagement, and utilized heavy weapons, including tanks and helicopter gunships. Under international consensus-based interpretations of IHL, massive use of military force by an occupying state against civilians in occupied territories (i.e., protected persons) would be categorically illegal. The state lawfare rationale advanced to justify the war model was premised on assertions that the law enforcement model (i.e., policing and riot control tactics) was no longer viable because the military was “out” of Palestinian areas, and because Palestinians possessed (small) arms and thus constituted a foreign “armed adversary.” Officials described the second intifada was an “armed conflict short of war,” and asserted Israel’s self-defense right to attack an ‘enemy entity,' while denying that those stateless enemies had any right to use force, even in self-defense.

Israeli claims that Palestinian areas are “no longer occupied” is the essential element to legitimize them as sites of warfare. This posture was reinforced when Israel unilaterally withdrew from Gaza in 2005. Following the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections that brought Hamas to power, the siege of Gaza intensified. Israel’s use of armed force peaked during “Operation Cast Lead” between 27 December 2008 and 18 January 2009, and again during “Operation Pillar of Defense” between 14 and 21 November 2012.

Israeli state lawfare innovations at the turn of the twenty-first century—including the “legalization” of targeted killing (elaborated in the following section)—are explained in a Haaretz investigative article about the International Law Division (ILD) of the Military Advocate General’s unit. According to Daniel Reisner, who headed the ILD until 2005, “We defended policy that is on the edge…. In that sense, ILD is a body that restrains action, but does not stop it.” He continues:

22 Israel’s continued exercise of effective control throughout the West Bank and Gaza is clearly evident in checkpoints and closures, continuing confiscation of Palestinian lands and Jewish settlement building, and arrest and prosecution or administrative detention of Palestinians.


What we are seeing now is a revision of international law...if you do something for long enough, the world will accept it. The whole of international law is now based on the notion that an act that is forbidden today becomes permissible if executed by enough countries...International law progresses through violations. We invented the targeted assassination thesis and we had to push it. At first there were protrusions that made it hard to insert easily into the legal moulds. Eight years later it is in the center of the bounds of legitimacy.

At the start of the second intifada, the US joined other governments in criticizing Israel’s excessive use of force. According to Reisner,

In April 2001 I met the American envoy George Mitchell [who was heading a fact-finding mission] and explained that above a certain level, fighting terrorism is armed combat and not law enforcement. His committee rejected that approach...It took four months and four planes to change the opinion of the United States, and had it not been for those four planes I am not sure we would have been able to develop the thesis of the war against terrorism on the present scale.

Indeed, following the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and the launching of a global “war on terror,” some key elements of Israeli state lawfare were emulated by the Bush administration. For example, over State Department dissent, White House and Justice Department lawyers asserted and the president accepted that the Geneva Conventions are inapplicable to US conduct in a war against stateless enemies. Another state lawfare position, driven by the desire to inoculate officials and state agents from future accountability for violations, was the assertion that ratified international treaties and federal laws are not binding or enforceable beyond the sovereign jurisdiction of the state. The US state lawfare edifice was termed “the new paradigm.”

The contents of the new paradigm were largely secret for the first several years of the “war on terror.” One notable exception was President Bush’s military order, issued on 13 November 2001, declaring that enemies are “unlawful combatants.” This invented concept aimed to evade IHL rules on the treatment of prisoners by designating people taken into US custody as neither combatants nor civilians and therefore not entitled to the rights of either.

Since mid-2004, an abundance of information about the new paradigm and its consequences has become public as a result of declassifications, leaks, and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) litigation, although much still remains classified. During this period, there has been a flourishing of litigation to challenge law-violating state policies and practices. To date, most “war on terror”-related cases have focused on the treatment of prisoners. As in Israel, with a handful of landmark exceptions in the Supreme Court, US courts have tended either to actively endorse the positions of the state by accepting state lawfare interpretations, or passively endorse them by declining to hear cases on the grounds that alleged violations are non-justiciable political questions, or would implicate states secrets or breach accused officials’ right to immunity.

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27 Ibid.
29 See www.thetorturedatabase.org.
2. Targeted Killing as Policy and Practice

A. The Israeli Context: From Doing and Denying to “Legalization”

During the first intifada, Israel instituted a secret policy of targeted killing in the occupied territories. These operations were conducted by undercover units who perfidiously disguised themselves as Arabs (mista’Arevim) to approach and execute their targets, or by snipers who killed from a distance. At that time, when the territories were indisputably under full control of the Israeli military and Palestinians were being arrested and prosecuted or administratively detained in unprecedented numbers (i.e., Israel had the highest per capita incarceration rate in the world at the time), killing suspects clearly constituted extra-judicial executions.

To evade war crimes allegations, for years Israel’s targeted killing policy was staunchly denied. In 1992 in response to B’Tselem’s reporting on assassination operations, a government spokesperson said, “There is no policy, and there will never be a policy or a reality, of willful killings of suspects…[T]he principle of the sanctity of life is a fundamental principle of the I.D.F.”

Important factors driving the uptick of targeted killings during the 1990s were the redeployment of the military out of Areas A and the introduction in 1993 of suicide bombings by Palestinian Islamists. Another factor was Israel’s achievement in developing remote surveillance and targeting technologies. By 2000, Israel had become the world leader in the manufacture and use of drones (unmanned air vehicles) and miniaturized missiles and detection devices.

The doing-and-denying phase ended on 9 November 2000, six weeks into the second intifada, when Israeli forces killed Hussein 'Abayat and two women “bystanders.” For the first time, the government acknowledged responsibility. A military spokesman announced:

During an IDF-initiated action in the area of the village of Beit Sahur, missiles were launched by IDF helicopters at the vehicle of a senior Fatah/Tanzim activist. The pilot reported an accurate hit…The action this morning is a long-term activity undertaken by the Israeli Security Forces, targeted at the groups responsible for the escalation of violence.

As with its pioneering legacy of “legalizing” torture (in 1987), Israel was the first state in the world to publicly proclaim the legality of “preemptive targeted killing.” Officials asserted the lawfulness of this practice on the following bases: (1) Palestinians were to blame for the hostilities, which constituted a war of terror against Israel, (2) the laws of war permit states to kill their enemies, (3) targeted individuals were “ticking bombs” who had to be killed because they could not be arrested, and (4) killing terrorists by means of assassination is a legitimate form of national defense. The deaths of untargeted civilians were termed, in accordance with the discourse of war, “collateral damage.” Orna Ben-Naftali and Keren Michaeli summarize the official position as it evolved over the last two months of 2000:

33 Na’ama Yashuvi, Activity of the Undercover Units in the Occupied Territories (Jerusalem: B’Tselem, 1992), p. 90.
On December 21, 2000, Voice of Israel Radio [reported] that there was a new policy of “pre-emptive operations,” that it was targeted at terrorists—as opposed to political leaders of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and Fatah, that the main method used was sniper fire, and that the IDF went to great lengths not to harm innocent bystanders. Testifying before the Israeli Parliament Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, an unnamed high ranking official in the security forces stated that “[t]he liquidation of wanted persons is proving itself useful…[This] activity paralyses and frightens entire villages and as a result there are areas where people are afraid to carry out hostile activities.”

Thabet Thabet, a political official and member of the PA, was assassinated on 31 December 2000. Afterward, Deputy Defense Minister Ephraim Sneh stated, “[W]e will hit all those involved in terrorist operations, attacks or preparation for attacks, and the fact of having a position within the Palestinian Authority confers no immunity on anyone.” By November 2001, one year into the publicly proclaimed policy, forty-seven people had been targeted and eighty deaths had resulted.

The most notorious targeted killing operation occurred on 22 July 2002 when an F-16 launched a one-ton bomb to assassinate Salah Shehadeh, a leader of Hamas’s military wing. The bomb destroyed the apartment building where Shehadeh lived and eight nearby buildings, and partially destroyed nine others in the densely populated Gaza neighborhood of al-Daraj. In addition to Shehadeh and his guard, fourteen Palestinians, including eight children, the youngest of whom was a 2-month-old, were killed, and more than 150 people were injured. In this instance, the military responded to public outcry about the size of the bomb, the targeting of a residential neighborhood, and the high casualty rate by conducting an investigation. The finding justified targeting Shehadeh as a perpetrator of terrorist violence while conceding that there had been “shortcomings in the information available,” namely the presence of “innocent civilians” in the vicinity of what was claimed to be Shehadeh’s ‘operational hideout.’

Between the start of the second intifada and 30 September 2012, 434 Palestinians were killed during targeted killing operations, of whom 259 were the targets; this statistic excludes Palestinians killed by other means. In Gaza especially, drone surveillance and the violent threat of aerial strikes it portends have been a constant feature of life for the population there.

In October and November 2012, Israel escalated air strikes and incursions into Gaza, and Palestinian militants retaliated with rockets fired across the boundary. On 14 November, as an Egyptian-brokered cease-fire agreement was being finalized, Israel launched a drone strike that killed Ahmed al-Jabari, the Hamas leader who was negotiating the truce with rockets fired across the boundary.

38 Ben-Naftali and Michaeli, “We Must Not Make a Scarecrow of the Law,” p. 239.
40 These figures from B'Tselem are cited in Michael Gross, “Fighting By Other Means in the

B. US Targeted Killings: From Strategic Secrecy to the Disposition Matrix

In the US, political assassination was prohibited by executive orders signed by every president since 1977. That prohibition ended in September 2001 when President Bush secretly authorized the CIA, a civilian organization, to capture or kill suspected terrorists around the world. The first drone strike outside of Afghanistan occurred on 3 November 2002 when a CIA-operated Predator launched from Djibouti shot a Hellfire missile into a car in Yemen. The target was Qa‘id Salim Sinan al-Harithi. One of the other six passengers killed in the strike, Kamal Darwish, was a US citizen. Afterwards, officials utilized Israeli-like reasoning to justify the operation, proclaiming that because Harithi was a member of al-Qaeda and allegedly involved in the 2000 bombing of the USS Cole, and because his arrest was not possible, targeted killing was a legitimate tactic, even against a person located in a country not at war with the US. However, the UN Special Rapporteur for Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions concluded that the Yemen strike “constitutes a clear case of extrajudicial killing.”

In Afghanistan, the first drone strike targeting individuals when they were not taking direct part in hostilities or during hot pursuit occurred in February 2002. When the “war on terror” was extended to Iraq in 2003, Israelis were provided to employ kill-operation training to US forces.

During the Bush administration, targeted killing by drones was done primarily by the CIA. But capture was the preferred option because of the national security imperative to elicit actionable intelligence. Tens of thousands of people were arrested, detained and interrogated by the US military, and an estimated 100 “high value detainees” (HVDs) by the CIA. The strategic choice between capturing and killing terror suspects and militants began to shift in 2006. This followed the Supreme Court’s Hamdan v. Rumsfeld decision which concluded that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions does apply to the treatment of prisoners in US custody and that torture and other violations are prosecutable offenses. The Bush administration condemned the decision, but nevertheless emptied the CIA black sites and relocated fourteen HVDs to Guantánamo. After that, transfers to Guantánamo tapered off, and halted entirely in 2008. That year, there was a ninety-four percent increase in drone strikes from the year before.

Since 2009 when Barack Obama assumed the presidency, targeted killing has escalated dramatically in terms of the number of strikes per month and the widening geographic scope. Under the Obama administration, separate but overlapping kill lists and drone fleets are maintained by the CIA and the military’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). Targeted raids by JSOC, first introduced in Iraq in 2006, were transported, along with the drones, to Afghanistan in 2009. By April 2011, they were occurring at a rate of 1,000 a month. According to John Rizzo, former acting general counsel for the CIA, “The Predator is the weapon of choice, but it could also be someone putting a bullet in your head.”

51 Under IHL, civilians have no right to fight except in extremely limited circumstances. The para-militarization of the CIA in the “war on terror” has become a topic of increasing debate. See Jane Mayer, “The Predator War: What Are the Risks of the CIA’s Covert Drone Program?” New Yorker, 26 October 2009, 38.
US claims about the “legality” of targeted killing hew to the same lines of argument as those of Israel, namely the legitimacy of executing people who pose an ostensibly imminent threat and cannot be arrested. However the geographic scope and the rates of attacks and casualties differ significantly. The Obama administration justifies its globalized prerogative to kill suspects on the basis of the Authorization To Use Military Force (AUMF). This legislation, passed by Congress days after the 9/11 attacks, set no territorial (or temporal) limits on the government’s response to terrorism. Citing the authority of the AUMF is a means of dodging criticism of executive branch overreach.

One other significant difference between the two countries’ policies is that the US has claimed the right to target citizens abroad. On 27 January 2010, the Washington Post reported that at least three citizens had been designated for extra-judicial execution. The first name on the list was Anwar al-Awlaki, an American-born Muslim cleric residing in Yemen who was characterized as a leader of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. The Post reported that al-Awlaki’s name had been added in late 2009, on the heels of two incidents to which he was reportedly linked—but never indicted. These incidents were the 5 November armed rampage by Major Nidal Malik Hasan at Fort Hood in Texas that killed thirteen and wounded twenty-nine people, and the 25 December attempt by a Nigerian, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, to detonate a bomb hidden in his underwear on a transatlantic flight bound for Detroit.

The revelation that the government intended to lethally target citizens spurred criticisms and more questions about expanding drone warfare. Top officials in the Obama administration were dispatched to make public statements about the legality and efficacy of targeted killing in general terms while maintaining that the planning and conduct of such operations are classified. State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh, who decried drone strikes as extra-judicial killings prior to joining the Obama administration, became a chief articulator of their legality. In a 25 March 2010 speech to the American Society of International Law, he stated:

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\text{[I]n this ongoing armed conflict, the United States has the authority under international law, and the responsibility to its citizens, to use force, including lethal force, to defend itself, including by targeting persons such as high-level al-Qaeda leaders who are planning attacks… Of course, whether a particular individual will be targeted in a particular location will depend upon considerations specific to each case, including those related to the imminence of the threat, the sovereignty of the other states involved, and the willingness and ability of those states to suppress the threat the target poses. In particular, this Administration has carefully reviewed the rules governing targeting operations to ensure that these operations are conducted consistently with law of war principles, including [distinction and proportionality].}\]

On 1 May 2011, in a joint CIA-JSOC operation, a team of Navy Seals raided the compound in central Pakistan where Osama bin Laden was hiding. Several hours later, President Obama addressed the nation, stating:

Tonight, I can report to the American people and to the world that the United States has conducted an operation that killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of al-Qaeda, and a terrorist who’s responsible for the murder of thousands of innocent men, women, and children… Justice has been done… The cause of securing our country is not complete. But tonight, we are once again reminded that America can do whatever we set our mind to.

60 http://www.state.gov/v/rls/rems/139119.htm.
Most Americans, including many law of war experts, endorsed the legality of this operation because bin Laden was a legitimate military target, although some bemoaned that killing rather than capturing him deprived victims of 9/11 of the kind of justice that prosecution would provide. While the operation seemed to vindicate the claim that targeted killing was effective in eliminating terrorists, bin Laden’s unique status did it did not resolve debates about the legality of the policy in general.

Five days after the bin Laden operation, the US launched a drone attack in Yemen targeting al-Awlaki. That mission failed to kill him but two others died. On 30 September 2011, a joint CIA-JSOC drone strike killed al-Awlaki and another US citizen, Samir Khan, along with two others. As he had done after the killing of bin Laden, Obama made a public address declaring that the attack had dealt a “major blow” to al-Qaeda. On 14 October, another drone attack killed al-Awlaki’s 16-year-old son ‘Abd al-Rahman, his 17-year-old cousin and five others while they were dining in an open-air restaurant.

On 8 October 2011, the *New York Times* published an exposé, based on anonymous sources, about the contents of a secret Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) memo to the Defense Department authored in 2010.

The legal analysis, in essence, concluded that Mr. Awlaki could be legally killed, if it was not feasible to capture him, because intelligence agencies said he was taking part in the war between the United States and Al Qaeda and posed a significant threat to Americans, as well as because Yemeni authorities were unable or unwilling to stop him.\(^{61}\)

This national self-defense reasoning hinges on the assertion that the target poses an *imminent* and grave threat. However, the government has refused to provide information to substantiate the allegation that al-Awlaki’s role, in the words of one official, had changed from “inspirational to operational.” Critics pointed out that the forward-looking principle of imminence seems to be contradicted by fact that al-Awlaki was listed after the Fort Hood attack and the underpants bombing attempt, and that the legal authorization to kill him, produced in 2010, appeared to be a standing order for execution.

On 5 March 2012, Attorney General Eric Holder delivered a national security speech in which he addressed critics of the targeted killing policy:

Some have called such operations “assassinations.” They are not, and the use of that loaded term is misplaced. Assassinations are unlawful killings.\(^{[T]}\) The US government’s use of lethal force in self defense against a leader of al Qaeda or an associated force who presents an imminent threat of violent attack would not be unlawful…

On the targeting of citizens, Holder said,

\(^{[T]}\)he government must take into account all relevant constitutional considerations…Of these, the most relevant is the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which says that a government may not deprive a citizen of his or her life without due process of law.

He continued,

Some have argued that the President is required to get permission from a federal court before taking action… This is simply not accurate. “Due process” and “judicial process” are not one and the same, particularly when it comes to national security. The Constitution guarantees due process, not judicial process.\(^{62}\)

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\(^{62}\) [http://www.mainjustice.com/2012/03/05/prepared-remarks-holders-address-at-northwestern-university/](http://www.mainjustice.com/2012/03/05/prepared-remarks-holders-address-at-northwestern-university/)
In late May 2012, the *Daily Beast* and the *New York Times* published exposés revealing new details about this “due process.” According to the *Times*, “Mr. Obama has placed himself at the helm of a top secret ‘nominations’ process to designate terrorists for kill or capture, of which the capture part has become largely theoretical.” Obama “signs off on every strike in Yemen and Somalia and also on the more complex and risky strikes in Pakistan.” Both articles describe “personality strikes,” which target specific individuals, and “signature strikes,” which target “groups of men who bear certain signatures, or defining characteristics associated with terrorist activity, but whose identities aren’t known.” Both articles also explain the administration’s method for deflecting criticism of civilian casualties by counting all military-age males in a strike zone as combatants “unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent.”

Two weeks later, twenty-six Democrats in Congress wrote to President Obama expressing concern about newly publicized information that the CIA and JSOC had been granted authority for signature strikes against unidentified targets. They wrote that drones “are faceless ambassadors that cause civilian deaths, and are frequently the only direct contact with Americans that the targeted communities have.” The president’s response, delivered three days later, blended boilerplate about the ongoing war against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces with the first public acknowledgment of military operations in Somalia and Yemen.

In October 2012, the *Washington Post* broke the story that since 2010, the National Counter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) has been developing a secret blueprint, called a “disposition matrix,” to coordinate the multiple targeting lists and drone programs. The disposition matrix

is a single, continually evolving database in which biographies, locations, known associates and affiliated organizations are all catalogued. So are strategies for taking targets down, including extradition requests, capture operations and drone patrols.

The names on the matrix and the criteria for being listed are secret. According to unnamed officials who spoke to the *Post*, the US has been building disposition capacities beyond Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia where drone strikes are most feasible and frequent, to target suspected terrorists and militants in other parts of Africa and the Pacific. The NCTC is the hub through which targeted killing decisions are vetted and coordinated. Those knowledgeable about the disposition matrix anticipate that it will remain a counter-terrorism mainstay for years.

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3. Lawfare and Targeted Killing

A. The Israeli Context

In January 2001, the first petition challenging Israel’s targeted killing policy was filed in the HCJ by Siham Thabet, the wife of the assassinated PA leader. A second petition was filed by Knesset Member Muhammad Barakeh for an order nisi and an interim injunction. Both were dismissed one year later with a brief statement: “The choice of means of warfare, used by the Respondents to preempt murderous terrorist attacks, is not the kind of issue the Court would see fit to intervene in.”67

On 24 January 2002, another petition challenging targeted killing was filed by the Public Committee against Torture in Israel and LAW: The Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and the Environment.68 The HCJ reconsidered its position of non-justiciability and requested briefs about the applicable laws and relevant rules of armed conflict. On 30 September 2003, the Israeli organization Yesh Gvul submitted a petition pressing for a criminal investigation of officials responsible for the Shehadeh operation. The HCJ accepted that petition but suspended consideration until it ruled on the legality of targeted killing.

The HCJ issued its targeted killing ruling on 15 December 2006. The decision, written by former Chief Justice Aharon Barak, begins with a section on the “factual background” which states: “A massive assault of terrorism was directed against the State of Israel, and against Israelis, merely because they are Israelis.” The decision then proceeds to summarize the petitioners’ and respondents’ positions. The petitioners asserted the state’s lack of the right of militarized self-defense (under Article 51 of the UN Charter) against an occupied civilian population by an occupying state, and the prohibition of arbitrary killing and execution without due process as violations of customary norms of international law. Moreover, the practice of targeted killing fails the “imminent threat” and the “proportionality” tests; most individuals were targeted at times when they were not taking a direct part in hostilities, and Israel has a “lesser harm” option of arresting them, as evidenced by ongoing arrests in Areas A. The last element of the petitioners’ challenge was the secrecy in which the policy operates; targeted individuals have no opportunity to prove their innocence, a problem exacerbated by numerous “mistakes” and compounded by the fact that officials offer no evidence before or after targeted killings to prove claims of imminent threat.69

The respondents advanced arguments to persuade the HCJ of the legality of targeted killing. Israel’s evolved doctrine that the territories are no longer occupied was elemental to the claim that the response to terrorism emanating from an “enemy entity” is not limited to law enforcement approaches. Despite the military’s ability to pursue and arrest people alive, the respondents asserted that killing is an “exceptional step” performed only “when there is no alternative.” On the issue of imminence, the respondents claimed that this does not reflect a rule of customary international law, and argued that the concepts of “direct part” and “hostilities” must be given wide berth to include planning, assisting, and abetting, and not be limited to the active use of violence and arms.

The HCJ summary of the petitioners’ and respondents’ positions illuminates the mutual influence of Israeli and US state lawfare. Both sides engaged with the question of whether “unlawful combatants” is a legally valid concept. The petitioners, in line with expert opinion on international law,70 argued that everyone involved in or affected by armed conflict is either a combatant or a civilian; there is no third category in IHL. The respondents, following the US position, say that terrorists are not civilians because they fight, and therefore they can be lawfully killed but if captured alive have none of the rights of either combatants or civilians.

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68 PCATI et al. v. The Government of Israel et al. HCJ 769/02.


In its judgment, the HCJ refers to the occupied territories as “the area” and “outside the bounds of the state,” thereby evading the question of whether Palestinians are protected persons. The “armed conflict” at issue is described as between Israel and terrorist organizations, and the decision claims that there has been “a continuous situation of armed conflict…since the first intifada.” Citing the US Supreme Court’s Quirin decision upon which the Bush administration based its formulation of unlawful combatants (which was the model for Israel’s 2002 unlawful combatant law), the HCJ addresses the validity of this category by claiming to side-step it:

We shall take no stance regarding the question whether it is desirable to recognize this third category. The question before us is not one of desirable law, rather one of existing law. In our opinion, as far as existing law goes, the data before us are not sufficient to recognize this third category…It does not appear to us that we were presented with data sufficient to allow us to say, at the present time, that such a third category has been recognized in customary international law. However, new reality at times requires new interpretation. Rules developed against the background of a reality which has changed must take on a dynamic interpretation which adapts them, in the framework of accepted interpretational rules, to the new reality…

In fact, the HCJ does not side step the issue because of its embrace of the expansive interpretation of “hostilities” as ongoing and ceaseless, and “taking part” as inclusive of all kinds of activities deemed threatening to Israel’s security. The refusal to contend with the actual status of the so-called “area” and their Palestinian inhabitants serves to endorse, by default, the category of unlawful combatants as persons who have no right to fight but who can be extra-judicially executed.

The conclusion the HCJ reaches in regard to the “the ‘targeted killing’—and in our terms, the preventative strike causing the deaths of terrorists, and at times also of innocent civilians” is that neither are “such strikes…always permissible or that they are always forbidden.” Some operations might be unlawful if, for example, a disproportionate amount of force was used to eliminate a legitimate target, but the policy as such is not illegal. This decision thus clearly provides another instance in which international law is interpreted by the state and endorsed by the HCJ to frame existing state practices as compatible with the law itself: “Indeed, in the State’s fight against international terrorism, it must act according to the rules of international law.”

Based on its judgment that the legality of each targeted killing operation must be examined retrospectively, the HCJ lifted its suspension of the Yesh Gvul petition and requested the state to investigate whether the Shehadeh operation comported with the ruling. A Special Investigatory Commission was established in January 2008, and announced its conclusion in February 2011 that the operation was a “legitimate targeted killing,” but “in hindsight,” the “difficult collateral consequences” were “disproportionate.” However, those consequences were “unintended, undesired and unforeseen” and, therefore, no disciplinary offences were committed and no criminal charges are warranted.

According to a 2008 investigative article in Haaretz Magazine, the “most noticeable thing the High Court ruling changed regarding the assassinations is the language used by the IDF in planning them.” Pre-planned kill operations were described as arrest operations that went awry and thus justified the deadly use of force. The investigation revealed that the IDF approved assassination plans in the West Bank even when it would probably have been possible to arrest the wanted men—in contradiction to the State’s statement to the High Court. Moreover, it turns out that the assassination of a target the defense establishment called part of a “ticking infrastructure” was postponed, because it had been scheduled to take place during the visit of a senior U.S. official.

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B. The US Context

In the US, litigation pertaining to targeted killing is more recent because the policy began ramping up in 2009. To date, lawsuits have been filed over two kinds of issues: the legality of targeting citizens, and FOIA litigation to puncture the secrecy shrouding the policy.

The first case followed the news that Anwar al-Awlaki had been placed on a hit list. The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) filed a lawsuit on behalf of his father Nasser to challenge executive authorization to extra-judicially execute a citizen (al-Aulaqi v Obama). The plaintiffs contended that this policy exceeds the president’s authority under the Constitution and international law. The Justice Department’s response brief urged the court to dismiss on procedural grounds, namely that the elder al-Awlaki lacks standing because the government was not planning to kill him. Two other reasons for dismissal were also offered: Either the court could toss out the case because any assessment of plaintiffs’ claims would require the court to “decide non-justiciable political questions,” or, even if the court deemed the claims to have merit, the information necessary to litigate them is “properly protected by the military and state secrets privilege.” On 7 December 2010, the court dismissed the case on lack of standing grounds, while noting that the legality of the drone program is a “political question” that falls under the purview of the president and Congress. Less than a year later, al-Awlaki, his son, and Khan were killed.

On 18 July 2012, the ACLU and CCR filed a civil suit on behalf of Nasser al-Awlaki and Sarah Khan (mother of Samir) against Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, then-CIA Director David Petraeus, Admiral William McRaven, and Lieutenant General Joseph Votel accusing them of violating the Constitution’s fundamental guarantee against deprivation of life without due process of law. The citizenship status of the three dead provides the opening to seek judicial review and unspecified damages. On 14 December, lawyers for the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss, and urged that “this Court should follow the well-trodden path the Judiciary—and particularly the D.C. Circuit—have taken in the past and should leave the issues raised by this case to the political branches.” If this case is not dismissed, as the government has urged, it would raise larger questions about the vague legal standards and secretive decision making and mark the first attempt in the US to adjudicate the meaning of “direct participation in hostilities” and “imminent threat” in relation to the policy of targeted killing.

The other trajectory of lawfare is the quest for information. In response to the upsurge of drone warfare, in March 2010 the ACLU filed a FOIA request with four government agencies seeking information about the legal basis and scope of the targeted killing program; the training, supervision, oversight, or discipline of drone operators and others involved in decision making; and data about civilians and non-civilians killed in drone strikes. The Departments of Defense, Justice, and State provided some records and withheld others, whereas the CIA refused to confirm or deny if it operates a drone program. The ACLU filed a suit against the CIA in July 2010 to compel disclosure. After the court accepted the CIA’s refusal to respond on the basis of its FOIA exemptions, the ACLU appealed. As of this writing, the DC Circuit Court has not issued its ruling.

The legal and factual basis for targeting citizens is another track of FOIA activity. On 19 October 2011, the ACLU filed a request for records, including the 2010 OLC memo, and all evidentiary materials related to al-Awlaki and other citizens who have been killed or listed. After the government refused to provide records, on 1 February 2012, the ACLU sued to enforce the request, and the case was joined with a New York Times lawsuit. On 2 January 2013 the case was dismissed, albeit with some judicial hand-wringing:

This Court is constrained by law, and under the law, I can only conclude that the Government has not violated FOIA by refusing to turn over the documents . . . , and so cannot be compelled by this court of law to explain in detail the reasons why its actions do not violate the Constitution and laws of the United States. The Alice-in-Wonderland nature of this pronouncement is not lost on me; but after careful and extensive consideration, I find myself stuck in a paradoxical situation in which I cannot solve a problem because of contradictory constraints and rules—a veritable Catch-22. I can find no way around the thicket of laws and precedents that effectively allow the Executive Branch of our Government to proclaim as perfectly lawful certain actions that seem on their face incompatible with our Constitution and laws, while keeping the reasons for their conclusion a secret.76

The most recent FOIA request, filed on 17 April 2012 by the ACLU and CCR, seeks records and information about a December 2009 attack in al-Majalah region of Yemen. One or two missiles fired from either a warship or a submarine killed forty-six people, including at least twenty-one children and fourteen women, five of whom were pregnant.77 Initially, the Yemeni government claimed responsibility. The ruse was undermined when unnamed officials gave statements to the media confirming that it was a US strike. In January 2010, Wikileaks released a classified diplomatic cable about a meeting after the attack between then-head of US Central Command Petraeus and then-Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh in which it was agreed that Yemen would claim responsibility for US attacks in the Abayyan province. This FOIA request seeks records on the intelligence that prompted the strike, including whether officials were aware of the presence of civilians; what if any steps have been taken to investigate the killing of civilians and to compensate survivors and victims’ families; and why a US official would plot with a foreign government to deceive the publics in both countries.

The US government’s position on targeted killing is a paradoxical blend of secrecy, selective leaking, and public statements by top officials who have taken credit for the program’s efficacy and legality and claimed minimal civilian casualties.78 In response to litigation, the government maintains that this program is classified, including the criteria for being targeted and the decision making process that precedes strikes.79 Under these circumstances, lawfare is a means of attempting to leverage the paradox to force court-ordered transparency and accountability for what has emerged as the centerpiece of US war and counter-terrorism policy.

76 www.aclu.org/files/assets/al-awlaki_foia_ruling.pdf
77 See the documentary video by Richard Rowley and Jeremy Scahill, “America’s Dangerous Game,” available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=m-e21x_qRAQ.
C. Lawfare in Other Venues

Does targeted killing, as practiced by the Israeli and US governments, comply with or violate IHL? Both governments have asserted that targeted killing is a legitimate form of national defense, and, as described above, national courts either actively endorsed its lawfulness or passively accepted its continuation. These positions do not enjoy much international endorsement, however. On the contrary, the legality of targeted killing is a matter of international controversy.

One way in which this controversy is playing out is through efforts to pursue accountability in foreign national courts. Under the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, some violations of international law, including war crimes, are so menacing to peace and security or degrading of human dignity that all countries have an interest in prosecuting foreign perpetrators.\(^8\) The Geneva Conventions attach a similar principle of accountability because every state party has a duty to avail its courts for prosecutions when those responsible for grave breaches are not prosecuted in their own country or the country where the alleged crime(s) occurred (aut dedere aut judicare).

Ironically, the US was one foreign legal system where accountability for Israeli targeted killing was pursued. Under US law, there is no avenue for privately-initiated criminal investigations for gross crimes, but there is the option to pursue civil action under the 1789 Alien Torts Statute, and the 1992 Torture Victims Protection Act which prohibits extra-judicial execution as well as torture.\(^8\) On 8 December 2005, CCR filed *Matar et al v Dichter*, a class action lawsuit against Avraham Dichter, former head of Israel's General Security Service, alleging his responsibility for the Shehadeh operation and his role in escalating Israel's practice of targeted killings. The plaintiffs were Ra'ed Matar, whose wife, three children and three other relatives were killed; Mahmoud al-Huweiti, whose wife and two children were killed; and 150 others who were injured. The Gaza-based Palestine Center for Human Rights (PCHR) represented the victims. Dichter, at the time the lawsuit was brought, was residing in Washington, DC, as a fellow at the Brookings Institute.

The Bush administration submitted a “Statement of Interest” arguing that Dichter is immune under federal common law and customary international law for any official acts. In May 2007, the case was dismissed. The plaintiffs appealed on the grounds that there is no immunity for war crimes. However, on 16 April 2009, the Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal, deferring to the executive’s position that it should decline to assert jurisdiction.\(^8\)

Efforts to pursue accountability for the Shehadeh operation were mounted in other countries as well. In the United Kingdom, a magistrate assessed evidence provided by British lawyers Daniel Machover and Kate Maynard from the firm of Hickman and Rose, and PCHR, against Doron Almog, who headed Israel’s Southern Command from 2000 to 2003, and issued an arrest warrant on the basis of the UK’s Geneva Conventions Act 1957. When Almog landed at Heathrow airport on 10 September 2005, he was advised that police were waiting to take him into custody. However, political interference by the British and Israeli governments enabled Almog to depart the country without disembarking from the plane. Once he was gone, the warrant was cancelled.\(^8\) Following several attempts to indict other Israelis in the UK, in 2011, Parliament narrowed the country’s international law enforcement mechanisms by granting the Director of Public Prosecutions veto power over the issuance of warrants for suspects from certain “protected countries” (i.e., important allies).

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81 In a 1980 landmark decision, *Filártiga v. Peña-Irala*, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that “foreign nationals who are victims of international human rights violations may sue their perpetrators in federal court for civil redress, even for acts which occurred abroad, so long as the court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant.” See [http://www.ccrjustice.org/ourcases/past-cases/81%2C3%20lita-v-pe%20em%20ala](http://www.ccrjustice.org/ourcases/past-cases/81%2C3%20lita-v-pe%20em%20ala).


In New Zealand, efforts were mounted to indict Moshe Ya’alon, Israeli Chief of Staff from 2002 to 2005. Local lawyers, using evidence provided by Hickman and Rose and PCHR, submitted a criminal complaint, and on 27 November 2006, a judge issued an arrest warrant on the basis of New Zealand’s Geneva Convention Act 1958 and International Crimes and International Court Act 2000. Rather than acting on the warrant when Ya’alon arrived in the country, the police sought the advice of the solicitor general, who consulted the attorney general who quashed the warrant the following day.

On 24 June 2008, four Spanish lawyers partnering with PCHR and Hickman and Rose filed a lawsuit in the Spanish National Court on behalf of victims of the Shehadeh operation against Almog; Dichter; Ya’alon; Dan Halutz, former commander of the Israeli Air Force; Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, former Defense Minister; his military advisor, Michael Herzog; and Giora Eiland, former head of the Israeli National Security Council. The suit urged Spain to assert jurisdiction because there had been no prosecutions in Israel and the Special Investigatory Commission, established the previous January, was not impartial because it was composed entirely of former military and intelligence officials and had no power to recommend criminal indictments.84

Despite political pressure to dismiss the case, the investigating judge proceeded, and subsequently ruled that because Gaza is not part of Israel, Spanish criminal law does not accord Israel primary jurisdiction over alleged war crimes committed there. This led to more intense political pressure. On 19 May 2009, Parliament passed a resolution calling on the government to draft legislation that would limit the country’s universal jurisdiction mechanisms to cases with a direct nexus to Spain (i.e., involving Spanish victims or accused who are present in the country). This law was rushed through without debate and went into effect the following November.85 However, on 31 October 2010, Spanish authorities refused Dichter a grant of immunity prior to a planned visit because his presence would provide a nexus for the case to move forward. As of this writing, the Shehadeh case is under consideration in the Spanish Constitutional Court.

Legal challenges overseas to US targeted killing have focused primarily on civilian deaths. In Pakistan and Yemen, in particular, accelerating drone warfare and collateral damage have contributed to political instability and intensified anti-American sentiment. The London-based Bureau of Investigative Journalism (BIJ) has been tracking strikes and investigating the identity or status (militant or civilian) of those killed. As of 31 December 2012, for Pakistan BIJ estimates between 473 and 889 civilian casualties (176 children) among the 2,600 to 3,404 total; for Yemen between 72 and 171 civilians (27-35 children) among the 374 to 1,068 total; and for Somalia between 11 and 57 civilians (1-3 children) among the 58 to 170 total.86

An investigative study about drone warfare in Pakistan conducted by people affiliated with law clinics at Stanford and New York Universities, Living under Drones,87 affirmed the quality of BIJ’s figures, and generated new information about the destabilizing and debilitating effects on communities constantly under threat of attack. The report recommends “that the US conduct a fundamental re-evaluation of current targeted killing practices,” and “also supports and reiterates the calls consistently made by rights groups and others for legality, accountability, and transparency in US drone strike policies.”

In July-August 2011, an exhibition in London, “Gaming in Waziristan,” featured Noor Behram’s collection of images and footage of civilians killed and injured by twenty-eight CIA drone attacks over the previous four years. The exhibition, organized by the British organization Reprieve and Pakistani human rights lawyer Shahzad Akbar, was part of Reprieve’s project, “Bugsplat,” which “aims to inject transparency into the use of drones in Pakistan and elsewhere.” (The term “bugsplat” is a description for humans killed by drones.)

85 A similar narrowing of national law occurred in 2003 in Belgium as a result of US diplomatic pressure in response to cases against American officials.
87 http://livingunderdrones.org/.
On 28 October 2011, Reprieve and Akbar’s Foundation for Fundamental Rights (FFR) organized the Waziristan Grand Jirga in Islamabad to open an international dialogue on drones. The gathering brought together tribal elders and victims’ families with lawyers, activists and artists from many countries. At the meeting, Tariq Aziz, a 16-year-old who had come with his father, volunteered to collect evidence that might be helpful to protect his family and community from harm. Three days later he and his 12-year-old cousin were killed by a Hellfire missile.

On 12 March 2012, Reprieve and solicitors from Leigh Day and Company introduced legal proceedings in the British High Court against Foreign Secretary William Hague on behalf of Noor Khan, whose father was one of dozens of civilians killed by a CIA drone strike on a jirga in Northwest Pakistan in March 2011. The case alleged that the General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), which operates under Hague's authority, provided “locational intelligence” to the CIA that was used in the strike. “GCHQ employees who assist CIA employees to direct armed attacks in Pakistan are in principle liable under domestic criminal law as secondary parties to murder...” This case aimed to get judicial review for the UK’s intelligence-sharing policy in cases where this information might be used for drone strikes. On 22 December, the application was dismissed because, as Lord Justice Moses wrote,

The claimant cannot demonstrate that his application will avoid, during the course of the hearing and in the judgment, giving a clear impression that it is the United States' conduct in North Waziristan which is also on trial.

He elaborated: “[T]he courts will not sit in judgment on the sovereign acts of a foreign state” because breaking with this principle would “imperil relations between the states.” This decision coincided with an announcement that a parliamentary committee would investigate the legality and use of drone warfare.

In February 2012, BIJ reported that in Pakistan the CIA had resumed the practice of second strikes (“double-tapping”) which have killed and injured rescuers, and strikes on funerals.

On 9 May, FFR filed two constitutional petitions in Pakistan’s High Court challenging the government’s failure to protect its citizens from US drone attacks. The petitioners asked the Court to order the government to bring the issue of drones before the UN Security Council and the ICC, to initiate criminal proceedings against Pakistanis and Americans responsible for civilian deaths, and to set up an independent commission to investigate civilian deaths by drone. On 6 June, UN Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay, during a trip to Pakistan, called for an investigation of drone strikes in which civilians had died.

On 21 June at an ACLU-sponsored meeting held in conjunction with the UN Human Rights Council’s discussion about the US war on terror, Christof Heyns, the Special Rapporteur for Extra-judicial, Arbitrary or Summary Executions, characterized the CIA’s second strikes that imperil rescuers as a “war crime.” Pakistan’s UN representative in Geneva, Zamir Akram, expressed agreement with Heyns, and urged the Council to investigate the use of drone strikes. He also called on the US “to respect the growing international opinion” that the use of drones “not only violates our sovereignty but also violates the UN charter in our view and also international law.”

93 Ibid.
In a 25 October 2012 speech at Harvard Law School, Ben Emmerson, the Special Rapporteur on Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, announced that he and Heyns would establish an investigative unit in early 2013 “to inquire into individual drone attacks, and other forms of targeted killings conducted in counterterrorism operations, in which it has been alleged that civilian casualties have been inflicted.” Explaining this decision, he stated, “If the relevant states are not willing to establish effective independent monitoring mechanisms … then it may in the last resort be necessary for the UN to act.” On the US stance that it has a global prerogative to execute people, Emmerson stated:

“The global war paradigm has done immense damage to a previously shared international consensus on the legal framework underlying both international human rights law and international humanitarian law. It has also given a spurious justification to a range of serious human rights and humanitarian law violations… [This] war paradigm was always based on the flimsiest of reasoning, and was not supported even by close allies of the US.”

Emmerson’s overarching point was that if there was a time during the first years of this century when it was acceptable or tolerable for state responses to terrorism to trump respect for human rights and the rules of IHL, that time is over.

94 The text of Emmerson’s speech is available at http://harvardhumanrights.wordpress.com/tag/ben-emmerson/

95 Ibid
Conclusion

First Israel and then the US have attempted to reinterpret international law—and for the US, federal law as well—to project the legality of their targeted killing policies and practices. These attempts exemplify state lawfare because they deviate from and defy international consensus about what is lawful in the conduct of war and armed conflict. In the case of Israel, the asserted right to engage in targeted killing in Gaza and the West Bank hinges on the (internationally rejected) proposition that they are no longer occupied and therefore are legitimate sites of warfare, and that extra-judicial execution of people who ostensibly cannot be arrested is a legitimate form of national self-defense. The US also asserts the national self-defense right to execute people, including citizens, but applies this claimed prerogative on a vastly larger scale.

I refer to these as “attempts” to reinterpret international law because targeted killing has not gained international credibility. Were they to succeed, however, targeted killing would become an option for any government. Recall Daniel Reisner’s words: “If you do something for long enough, the world will accept it …International law progresses through violations.”

Lawfare has been a means of defending international consensus-based interpretations of IHL. In countries other than Israel or the US where lawsuits have been mounted, even when those cases have been dismissed—and even when national laws have been narrowed to impede such cases in the future—there has been no foreign governmental endorsement of the legal justifications for targeted killing. Rather, those judicial outcomes are the result of political pressure, diplomatic arm-twisting, or the desire not to offend allied governments.

Lawfare has not (yet) succeeded to achieve accountability for extra-judicial executions and civilian deaths, nor forced a decisive return to international consensus-based behavior by either the Israeli or the US government. Lawfare has, however, been a means of exposing the contents and rationales of these states' positions. This exposure, in turn, has contributed to making their targeted killing policies an issue of increasing international concern and activity. Thus, the value of lawfare should not be judged solely on the basis of judicial outcomes, but rather on the long-term significance of challenging law violations. Without such challenges, powerful states would be unhindered in their state lawfare efforts to rewrite the laws of war to make international consensus-defying policies they wish to employ appear legal. The law has not been rewritten.