Reorienting America's Foreign Policy Toward North Africa and the Middle East
Applying Lessons From the Arab Uprisings
Leila Hilal, Middle East Task Force, New America Foundation
February, 2013

To better support protesters’ demands for “bread, freedom, and dignity,” the United States should restructure its foreign policies towards the Middle East and North Africa according to a "do-no-harm" approach. Focusing on Egypt, this brief proposes a new agenda by taking into account two key pillars of U.S. policy in the region: diplomacy, both public and private, and foreign aid. The brief offers a series of recommendations for the United States to adopt in reshaping its policies.

The Arab uprisings that shook the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have raised significant questions about the efficacy of America’s leadership in the region. After decades of aligning with and materially supporting authoritarian regimes, the United States was forced to abandon several allied Arab leaders in a remarkably short amount of time, out of deference to universal values and public will. The result left Washington exposed, lacking long-standing traditional allies and doubting basic strategic assumptions.

Many in U.S. policy-circles responded to the uprisings by calling for a foreign policy rethink—a new approach that would improve America’s ability to adapt to geopolitical shifts and support envisaged democratic transitions.¹ What is distracting from this line of debate is a growing tendency to view the region’s upheaval as disruptive, thereby demanding containment, rather than transformative and requiring strategic innovation. But America’s response should not be limited to merely managing crises. A larger opportunity is available for a broader rethink.

The protesters were motivated by longstanding grievances which were rooted in policies that bear an American footprint. American foreign policies
contributed to the creation of a maligned political order which, in turn, was rejected by mass movements across the region. Ending U.S. military occupations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and avoiding new ones, may be a step toward scaling-back U.S. interference. But it would be naïve to conclude that the United States has withdrawn or is withdrawing from the region. Washington continues to wield significant diplomatic and material influence in the Arab world.

The question, therefore, is not whether or not the United States is engaged. The pressing questions are: How should the United States engage? Can it play a constructive role in supporting transitions in individual countries and regionally? Does a constructive role necessarily entail an active or interventionist one? Which policy mistakes have been the most damaging to progress in the region? How can they be avoided going forward? These questions implicate the larger strategic context defining U.S. policy in the region. President Obama’s second term is a fitting time to delve back into these issues as part of an inclusive, evidence-based rethink.

While it would be naïve to expect an imminent overhaul of U.S. strategy in MENA, domestic politics in the United States and events in MENA have unleashed processes that afford substantial opportunities to begin reviewing previous assumptions. Dialogue between MENA citizens and U.S. policy advocates, focused on how to influence bi-lateral and multi-lateral policies toward meeting the original demands for “bread, freedom and dignity,” may be able to positively influence the processes in play and potentially hasten national transitions in the region.

The New America Foundation’s Middle East Task Force (METF) and the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs of the American University of Beirut (IFI) collaborated to study these fundamental questions. We aimed to delineate an approach of “lessening harms” as a positive framework for debating a policy reset. We focused on Egypt in this first inquiry due to the country’s historical position as a key American ally. Egypt’s status as a country “in transition” was also taken into account.

The study’s methodology relied upon comprehensive consultations and expert study, including a workshop at the American University of Beirut (AUB) in the summer of 2012, convened by METF and IFI. Analysts, academics, and civil society leaders from the United States, Europe, Egypt, and other parts of the Arab world participated. Institutional representation included the METF, IFI/AUB, Carnegie Middle East Center of Beirut, the Arab NGO Network for Development, and the European Council on Foreign Relations. METF also commissioned studies from Issandr El Amrani, a Cairo-based writer and political analyst on Middle East affairs, and Anne Mariel Zimmerman (née Peters), assistant professor of government at Wesleyan University, and an expert on American foreign assistance policies in the Middle East.

Although the study was focused on Egypt, the findings presented are relevant to the wider set of U.S.-Arab relations, especially relating to American allies in the region with a high degree of dependency upon the United States (e.g., Jordan and the Palestinian Authority).

The Legacy of U.S.-Egyptian Relations

Decades of heavy American bi-lateral investment in Egypt did not lead to an environment conducive to human development or geopolitical stability. During the 1990s and 2000s when U.S. leaders intensively promoted economic and political reforms in Egypt, the country’s GDP grew notably, but impoverishment deepened, emergency rule continued, and authoritarianism became more entrenched. Similar
economic and political conditions existed in Tunisia where pro-growth reforms proceeded against a backdrop of increasing state security control, growing income inequality, and substantial regional disparities. In both cases, public anger exploded into a revolution, propelled by deep-seated frustrations over living conditions and employment opportunities. Incidences of popular unrest are now occurring in other allied nations such as Jordan and Palestine, where regime resilience can no longer be taken for granted. Some predict that the Gulf States may similarly be susceptible to instability due to frustration over the political status quo and poor socio-economic conditions.

Unpacking the legacy of the U.S.-Egyptian relationship reveals several consequences of an American strategic policy that contributed to human insecurity and geopolitical instability.

Outdated Priorities
American foreign policy has been hardwired around a core set of strategic priorities: (i) Israeli security; (ii) the reduction of threats to the United States, focused on counterterrorism and Iranian containment; (iii) unfettered access to hydrocarbon resources; and (iv) American trade opportunities, especially relating to weapons procurement. Liberal values constitute a fifth strand of interests pursued in varying iterations and intensities. The fifth strand of interests, which is usually the most publically articulated justification of U.S. actions in MENA, is often subordinated to the four other strands of strategic priorities.

Of the four main strategic priorities or assumptions, three have made it difficult to adapt U.S. policy in the region despite the signs of instability. The first is the greater emphasis placed on national security over human welfare. For over ten years, federal budgeting for MENA has devoted an average aggregate of 70-80% of regional funding appropriations to peace and security (military budgets and weaponry), whereas the “Investing-in-People Sector” (health, education and social services, and protection for vulnerable people) has typically received less than 10% of the budget. Economic Support Funds (ESF), as a mainstay component of bi-lateral development assistance to Egypt, has shrunk from $800 million to $250 million per year. The $1.3 billion Egypt receives annually in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) has remained constant since 1987.

The “limping gait” between a strong military leg and much weaker development one has been widely acknowledged by pro-democracy advocates in the United States. These acknowledgments have generally been grounded in the viewpoint that the United States should demonstrate a clearer commitment to human rights and development in Egypt. They tend, however, to avoid, albeit not deny, the fact that Washington’s conventional strategic prioritization has acted as an obstacle to adapting policy in the region. Many who promote democracy in MENA neglect to acknowledge the role played by the U.S.’s commitment to Israel in determining its overall posture in the region. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict and American positioning vis-à-vis Israel is mostly treated as a distinct or separate issue regarding U.S. bi-lateral relationships in MENA. Sidestepping the centrality that Israeli interests play in shaping U.S. policy is a trend that is increasing in the wake of the uprisings as analyses and responses have become increasingly localized and reactive. An immediate and constructive point of focus would be to highlight the negative consequences of insisting on triangulating US-Arab bi-lateral relations with Israel.

Commercial pursuits have also been contributing to the ossification of foreign policy in MENA. Bi-lateral trade agreements, USAID contracts, and weapons deals provide substantial economic and political opportunities for U.S. manufacturers, contractors and Congressional representatives, as well as the American people, through increased employment opportunities. The resilience of the U.S. military industrial complex is
particularly pronounced in relation to Egypt given the excessive amount of FMF going to Egypt.\textsuperscript{13} Per bilateral agreement, Egypt is required to use American funding to procure U.S. weapons, upgrades to existing equipment, and follow/support maintenance contracts.\textsuperscript{14} Egyptian arms purchases are made through the "Cash Flow Financing" mechanism which allows buyers and sellers to bank on anticipated federal funding, thus locking in future budget appropriations for Egypt’s military.\textsuperscript{15} Similar requirements apply to ESF development allocations, which are reserved by law to procure American contractors, expert consultants, food, and goods.\textsuperscript{16} With a complex set of interests at stake, adapting policy implicates a domestic political battle as well as international ones.

**Strategic Paradoxes**

Liberal values, the fifth strand of American interests in the Middle East, have been portrayed as very strategically important in U.S.-Arab relations over the past two decades. President Clinton placed liberal principles at the heart of his foreign policy strategy, and strongly promoted market democracy in the developing world. President George W. Bush championed a democracy agenda under the slogan “The survival of liberty in our land increasingly depends on the success of liberty in other lands,” linking his foreign policy agenda with the War on Terror and American military adventurism.\textsuperscript{17} President Bush also increased federal spending on democracy and governance programming and established multi-country accounts focused on liberalized reform in MENA. President Obama retained many of these value-promotion mechanisms, albeit via a softer diplomatic stance. President Obama has also rhetorically emphasized the centrality of values to the U.S. relationship with Arab states as a key pillar of his response to the uprisings.\textsuperscript{18}

In practice, however, values have never been given the same significance as other strategic priorities. This paradox, while most obvious under the second Bush administration, has existed for over thirty years of American engagement in the region. In her review of U.S. economic aid to Egypt, Anne Mariel Zimmermann outlines numerous examples where U.S. aid practitioners “only supported reforms where there was support for them within some faction of the [ruling National Democratic Party]” with the aim of leaving "the [President Anwar] Sadat and [President Hosni] Mubarak regimes intact."\textsuperscript{19} According to Zimmermann, “Egypt’s political economy contained clear red lines that not even its own incumbent leadership, let alone any donor that supported it, would be willing to cross.”\textsuperscript{20} For years, U.S. support for democracy in MENA has also been contingent on the exclusion of Islamist parties and those opposed to normalization with Israel. Recent U.S. openings toward Islamist leaders in Egypt have been attributed by some as relaying satisfaction with President Mohammed Morsi’s ostensible commitment to maintaining the status quo with Israel rather than a true reformulation of American policy, indicating less a policy shift than a strategic balancing of traditional interests.\textsuperscript{21}

At a deeper structural level, the Arab uprisings exposed contradictions in U.S. foreign policy that cannot be overcome merely with increased levels of democracy funding or strong rhetorical statements endorsing pluralism. There is a need for the U.S. to reconcile its support to Israel, national security agenda, and commercial interests with its commitment to democratic values, in order to move beyond a policy of reaction to one that promotes human development and longer-term stability.

Another pressing paradox revealed by the Arab uprisings relates to the appropriateness of market-driven conceptions of democracy for meeting economic and social challenges in the region today. This downside is best exemplified by Clinton’s promotion of free market reforms as key pillars of global prosperity and democracy in the post-Cold War era. The
“Washington Consensus” devised by President Clinton was largely meant to benefit U.S. businesses.²² Yet it was promoted by multilateral institutions and through U.S. bi-lateral economic assistance programs, under the guise of benefiting the developing world.

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Egypt responded by accelerating the privatization of public enterprises and deregulation of the labor market. These moves resulted in increased foreign investment, but were largely opposed by Egyptian workers, who experienced greater job insecurity and fewer work opportunities.²³ Demonstrators have consistently cited neoliberal reforms as a major grievance in the Egyptian uprisings.²⁴ Meeting protestors’ demands for social justice, while still a normatively unspecified objective, will likely entail support for programs that contravene so-called consensus economic assumptions.

Client-Patron Relations
Another structural downfall of U.S. foreign policy in the Arab world has been the nature of bi-lateral relationships between America and its allied governments in the region. For decades, the United States used its foreign assistance and diplomatic strength to leverage the complicity of regimes in meeting American strategic priorities. In return for American backing, allied governments were expected to relinquish aspects of their national sovereignty, including economic and foreign policy agendas. In the case of Egypt, the quid pro quo cementing the bi-lateral relationship was grounded in security arrangements, including the exchange of more than $50 billion in annual foreign military funding since 1979 for privileged U.S. access to the Suez Canal, as well as fly-over rights, Mubarak’s backing of the Middle East peace process, and American military operations in the region.²⁵ The patronage has also been used at the strategic level to ensure Egyptian operational support in keeping the Rafah border crossing between Gaza and the Sinai closed and controlling Gaza’s tunnel economy, as well as historically maintaining an isolationist position toward Iran.²⁶ The Sadat and Mubarak regimes likewise leveraged American support to reinforce their grip on power.²⁷

Following the fall of Mubarak, some predicted that new authorities would reclaim unpopular aspects of Egypt’s foreign policy, such as close cooperation with Israel or its posture toward Iran. To date, the dominant Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) has indicated a willingness to conform to the status quo on both foreign and economic policy, likely strategizing that it can similarly leverage resources and backing from the U.S. and multilateral institutions by acting the part of a reliable authoritarian client.
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Another problematic consequence of decades of bilateral patronage has been the narrowing of entry points for U.S. leaders. When Mubarak and the National Democratic Party fell in 2011, the United States was left with limited contacts. Without a broad network of interlocutors, the United States relied heavily on its military contacts in Egypt. To the extent that the U.S. has reconstituted new relations in Egypt, charges have arisen that American officials empowered the Muslim Brotherhood in their search for a new client. The merits of this charge remain debatable, but it underscores a downside of overinvesting in a client-patron relationship driven primarily by limited external interests.

Credibility Deficits
Decades of American alignment with President Mubarak and other authoritarian regimes have significantly damaged Washington’s standing in MENA. Arab perceptions of the United States were particularly negative after George W. Bush’s tenure. These negative attitudes were temporarily alleviated by Obama’s election and his 2009 “new beginnings” speech in Cairo. In 2009 following the President’s reconciliation gesture, annual polls showed a sharp positive increase in opinions of the United States. However, the gain was short lived. Attitudes dropped steeply in 2010, indicating the fragility of the U.S.-Arab relationship. The Obama administration put forth a softer diplomatic tone and embraced pro-democracy movements following the uprisings. Some criticized both actions as late coming, and the polling done afterwards showed only a negligible increase in attitudes.

Compounding America’s credibility problems are inherent inconsistencies in policies toward the region. The strands of contradiction vary from the strategic paradoxes noted above to differences in treatment between allied versus non-allied states in the region. With respect to the former, unpopular economic reforms rooted in the “Washington Consensus” are often overlooked but remain a significant part of the challenges to U.S. credibility in the region. Today as Egypt struggles through a fiscal crisis, the IMF has championed much maligned structural adjustment economic policies, although they are largely imputed to the United States. At a minimum, Egyptian and regional development activists have sought to increase transparency around the negotiation of trade and multilateral economic agreements.

In terms of the contradictory treatment of states in the region, Middle East expert Marc Lynch recently noted that one of the greatest contradictions complicating the ability of the United States to “clearly align itself with the popular aspirations for change in the region” is what he termed the “Saudi exception.” The muted response to Gulf regime-perpetrated human rights abuses, including the blatant example of Bahrain’s violent crackdown on Shiite protesters seeking an end to systematic discrimination, undermines the professed commitment to values and democracy for the region, and in turn makes it more difficult for the United States to take consistently principled stands on human rights and accountability issues in other allied countries.

Meanwhile, the outcome for America is a decline in soft power. According to a Gallup Poll conducted in 2012 at the height of a standoff with Egyptian authorities over the treatment of NGO workers, 71% of Egyptians said that they were willing to forgo U.S. bi-lateral
assistance. Today, many NGOs in the region remain reluctant to accept American assistance, which is also due to the conditions attached to USAID contracts. America’s credibility problem is structurally rooted and predicated on outdated strategies that have yet to embrace the full sovereignty and equality of states in the region or prioritize human welfare as an avenue toward greater regional stability and progress. Fixing America’s credibility deficit will require more than conciliatory statements, improved trade relations, and increased development assistance.

Towards a do-no-harm approach

The following principles offer suggestions for reorienting policies to mitigate the harms of the past decades.

Adopt a Stance of Humility, Not Indifference

Is more or less American leadership needed in the wake of the Arab uprisings? Is a strategy of leading from behind really leading at all with respect to U.S. policy in MENA? These questions framing the debate on U.S. foreign policy in MENA underscore the deep anxiety felt by some policy-makers about the changing nature of the relationship with Egypt and other traditional allies. The anxiety is linked, in large part, to the strategic framework that has grounded the old relationship of dependency and entitlement. That relationship has been fraying and will likely continue to do so. This process should be embraced, but with the intention of deliberately reformatting the bi-lateral relationship around a set of shared priorities responsive to longer-term stability.

To achieve this posture, American leaders must first come to terms with their inability to micromanage states in the region. Egypt and other Arab states in transition should be granted the space to forge new foreign policies, national economic platforms, and social contracts. In Egypt, where the political transition began without a solid constitutional footing, the road ahead will certainly be marred by crises. In Tunisia, the process has been comparatively smoother, although there are clear signs of tensions.

In these contested terrains, the United States should refrain from intervening in a manner that invokes the heavy hand of the past. The Obama administration has exercised caution in the manner in which it responded to President Morsi’s sponsorship of an unpopular constitution and crackdown on the opposition. Careful public messaging from the White House can certainly avoid the charge of undue interference, but American, Gulf and multi-lateral assistance to Egypt and country-level diplomacy can also be leveraged for authoritarian brinkmanship. The full scope of influence needs to be accounted for if American policy-makers are to internalize a posture of humility but not indifference.

Adopt Aid Policies of Long-term Strategic Benefit

The key to achieving real transformation from authoritarianism is the creation of strong, effective institutions grounded in constitutional guarantees that enjoy the broadest possible consensus. Over the past two decades, American aid to MENA has proven largely ineffective in promoting sustainable, independent institutions, due to its highly political nature. Moreover, investments in the foundation of strong institutions, such as regulatory reforms and the creation of independent oversight and enforcement mechanisms, are not likely to pay off during a time of protracted political crises, which are ongoing in Egypt. Given longer-term objectives, contextual complications, and the unlikelihood of an imminent overhaul of U.S. or multi-lateral economic strategy toward the region, can major foreign assistance initiatives play a constructive role in Egypt and other transitioning countries today?

In general, there is a danger in creating dependency on foreign aid or utilizing foreign resources to supplant local ones. Neither outcome promotes national
political or economic sovereignty or long-term governance capacities. These lessons have been widely acknowledged in the aid industry but less so as it pertains to the Middle East due to geopolitical ‘exceptionalism’. The opportunity now exists to reconsider programmatic goals and methodologies, even if the solutions are somewhat unconventional.³⁶ Debt relief packages, helping recover misappropriated assets, and direct capital infusion to local governments adhering to standards of transparency, may be alternative vehicles for alleviating the fiscal crisis facing Egypt in the meantime.³⁷

Additional steps that could be taken in advance of a major strategic overhaul include revisiting foreign assistance mechanisms which limit policy adaption such as the Cash Flow Financing mechanism, or the “3:2 peg” of U.S. aid to Israel and Egypt.³⁸

**Abandon Democracy Promotion (As We Know It)**

U.S. democracy programming has rested heavily on grants to NGOs engaged in electoral-related activity and market-linked democracy-building activities. But the usefulness of this type of support in effecting fundamental change is questionable. First, the mass mobilizations that toppled the Mubarak and Ben Ali regimes were driven primarily by informal networks, unaffiliated and entrepreneurial activists, and labor unions.³⁹ In both Egypt and Tunisia, key precursors to the revolution occurred outside of the capitals, where the well-funded NGO class resides. In addition, people were mobilized in part by poor economic conditions left unchallenged by most American democracy activities. These trends continue today, as evidenced by a review of the major recipients of U.S. democracy funding.⁴⁰ Second, the success of Islamist parties in competitive elections in Egypt and Tunisia was linked to their adeptness at harnessing frustrations with elite policies and utilizing informal networks. Third, secular opposition groups receiving U.S. democracy funds have yet to coalesce into effective political coalitions. The results suggest that continuing to channel funds into well-organized democracy promotion NGOs will have minimal impact in a complicated transitional context.

An additional note of caution must be raised when considering the longer-term objective of institution building as a core necessity for a sustainable transition from authoritarianism. NGOs play a key role in harnessing citizen activism, protecting women and minority groups, and promoting government accountability. But policy should not err on the side of creating a burgeoning NGO sector without strong institutions capable of performing effectively and meeting citizen needs. Support to CSOs and NGOs should not contribute to the attrition of institutions. Efforts to address this gap should include revisiting the USAID practice of placing foreign experts in government institutions for purposes of building skills and again over-emphasizing support for electoral activity.⁴¹

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**The United States’ goal should not be to handpick leaders, but rather to dissuade those leaders who lack full legitimacy from preempting democratic contestation and transformation.**

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**Incentivize Rather Than Penalize**

As political and economic crises deepen in Egypt, Washington may be tempted to resort to aid conditioning.⁴² But conditioning aid would likely risk political capital with little advantage. Congress conditioned Egypt’s military aid package in FY 2012 on a transfer to civilian power, respect for human rights and continued adherence to the Camp David Accords.⁴³ The Obama administration fought hard against the conditionality, arguing that it would constrain its diplomatic options at a critical juncture. In the end, the
conditions were waived by the administration with Congressional acceptance, despite the failure of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces to fulfill the first two conditions. The result was viewed cynically by Egyptian democracy activists. It reinforced perceptions amongst the general population that Washington cares more about Israeli security than Egyptian human rights.

Furthermore, conditioning aid would risk political capital, with no guarantee of improvements in human rights and the rule of law. It would also distract from the larger question of how to rebalance the broader relationship. Instead, incentive measures that provide support to governments that have demonstrated commitment to institutional reform, transparency and accountability should be bolstered, albeit taking into account the need to avoid initiatives grounded in social engineering enterprises. To enable policy development and increase effectiveness in this area, administration strategists should consider laying out a broad framework of change against which they can publicly and privately message to MENA states in a consistent fashion. Such a step would have to go beyond the endorsement of general values without over-prescribing national economic, social and political policies.

**Opportunities for Change**

Even as the Arab Awakening turns into successive political crises, neither American policy-makers nor citizens of MENA can afford to simply respond to daily events or revert to status quo postures: the result would perpetuate political instability and distract from the need for fundamental changes. While crisis responses may be necessary to restore security in Egypt or stave off economic collapse, the larger picture begs a strategic reset, focusing on the two main pillars of U.S. engagement in the region: aid and diplomacy. The first step in engaging this reset consists of highlighting the structural flaws in U.S. policies. These structural problems must eventually be addressed for the United States to be able to positively engage the region by learning from its past mistakes.

In his far-reaching “Arab Spring” speech of May 19, 2011, President Obama noted the exceptional historical moment ushered in by the uprisings. He cautioned against basing U.S. strategy “solely upon the narrow pursuit” of decades-old priorities that would not “fill an empty stomach or allow someone to speak their mind.” He spoke about the need for a new strategy based on respect for national and individual “self-determination,” delivered with “humility” and through a process formulated on “mutual interests and mutual respect.” His speech reflects an understanding within the White House of the tenuousness of the status quo. Moving from rhetoric to meaningful action will require a new strategic consensus from within U.S. policy makers.
circles that also resonates with Egyptian visions of progress.

To be sure, achieving a relationship reset along these lines is far from imminent. The foreign policy establishment in the U.S. suffers from inertia. Significant domestic interests backed by mobilized lobbies often preclude new policies from being implemented in a timely manner. Additional hurdles include weak interagency policy coordination and longstanding Congressional-Executive procedural tensions. In the two years since the uprisings began, it is therefore not surprising that both diplomacy and aid programming toward traditionally allied countries in the region have remained largely stagnant.

Changing the foreign policy status quo toward MENA will necessitate strong leadership from the White House. It will also depend on the ripeness for change within the wider set of relevant government agencies, and ultimately the U.S. domestic political environment. Egyptians will also have to play a role in directing beneficial American engagement. The road ahead is long, but emerging debates in the United States over defense spending, economic austerity, and shifting geopolitical priorities presents an opportunity to reconsider previously untouchable assumptions. The challenge will be to do so on the basis of the need to work towards a deliberate restructuring of policy rather than simply pulling back. New policies in MENA will require informed debates that include multiple voices across U.S. agencies and from throughout the region.
Notes

The paper was published with support by a grant from the Open Society Foundations.


12 Dunne, “Rethinking U.S. Relations with a Changing Egypt,” 5 (noting the example of qualifying duty free status for Egyptian exports on 10.5 percent Israeli components.)

13 Defense experts have noted that Egypt's military operational capacity does not correlate to the amount of money and training being directed to its armed forces through American bi-lateral aid. Unpublished conference transcript, American University of Beirut, Lebanon, June 2012.

14 Israel is given $3 billion annually in Foreign Military Financing. It's given the exclusive privilege to purchase and build weapons in country.


19 Zimmerman, “Drawing Red Lines.”


22 Zimmerman, “Drawing Red Lines.”


El Amrani, “US-Egypt Relations.”


Marc Lynch, “America’s Saudi Problem: Obama can’t get it right on the Arab Spring unless he holds Saudi Arabia to account.” Foreign Policy, January 17, 2013, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/01/24/america_s_saudi__arabia_problem_barack_obama.

Zimmermann, “Drawing Red Lines.”

Ibid.

Ibid.


The U.S. has granted debt relief to countries on a mass scale in previous instances. Curt Tarnoff and Marian Leonardo Lawson, “Foreign Aid: An

38 Zimmermann, “Drawing Red Lines.”


40 For instance, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED), the second largest implementing agency of American foreign assistance to MENA, granted nearly 54% of its FY 2011 budget for Egypt to the Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) and the Project on Middle East Democracy (POMED), both of which are based in Washington D.C. CIPE "strengthens democracy around the globe through private enterprise and market-oriented reform." They received approximately $1.1 million to "facilitate dialogue on democratic governance" and engage Egypt’s business community to promote legislative reforms. POMED, an advocacy organization that partners with democracy activists in MENA, is the the second largest NED grant recipient. NED also provides dozens of small grants to Egyptian organizations mostly to support electoral related activity. “Egypt,” National Endowment for Democracy, http://www.ned.org/where-we-work/middle-east-and-northern-africa/egypt.

41 Zimmermann, “Drawing Red Lines.”


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