Describing the Lebanese Youth:
A National and Psycho-Social Survey

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Charles Harb is an associate professor of psychology at the American University of Beirut, Lebanon. His research interests lie in social and political psychology, and focus on social identities, self-construals, and values across cultures, with a special emphasis on the dynamics in the Arab world.

This study has undergone rigorous blind peer reviewing by international scholars.
I- Background:

Arab populations are surprisingly young, with over 30% of the population (or 100 million) in the 15-29 age group, leading many analysts to refer to an Arab population “youth bulge” (Khalifa, 2009). The 15 to 24 age group, which represents the transition from childhood to adulthood in most societies, has escalated from 33.7 million in 1980, to 67.9 million (or 20.9%) in 2005. The youth population is expected to increase to 73 million by 2015 (Khalifa, 2009; ESCWA, 2009).

Arab youth are more educated and marrying at a later age than before, but the Arab region still suffers from one of the highest illiteracy rates in the world (over 60 million), with only 62.2% of the region’s population of 15 and over able to read and write (Hammoud, 2005). Furthermore, youth unemployment rates are also the highest in the world, ranging between 20% and 40% as compared to worldwide averages of 10-20% (ESCWA, 2009). Some organisations estimate that one in every three young Arabs is currently without a job.

Arab policy makers are acutely aware of the population youth bulge, and the tremendous challenges these demographics entail. The large number of youth entering the workforce will remain on the increase until at least 2020, with some estimates pointing to the necessity of creating 5 million new jobs every year to absorb this young working force. These workforce related challenges are complicated by a dearth of information in the socio-political domain: we know very little about what Arab youth believe in, their value preferences, the identities they endorse, what groups they affiliate with, their socio-cultural orientations, etc.

The 18-25 age group is a sensitive and high value sub-population: it represents a population stratum that has crossed the turbulent adolescent years, and is now witnessing a crystallization of both identities and value structures. These formative years shape the growing individual into the socially active adult that will be playing a central role in public affairs soon after. Considering the many challenges that Arab polity face, it becomes necessary and urgent to investigate the Arab youth’ identity and values profile to have a better understanding of current Arab populations, states, and their likely future.

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1 See comprehensive regional reports published by ESCWA (2009), UNFPA, and the ILO. For more detailed reports on human development in the Arab region, see the United Nations Development Program’s Arab Human Development Reports (UNDP-AHDR).
II- Research Proposal:

The present research investigates socio-demographic, socio-cultural and social-psychological profiles of a representative sample of Lebanese youth. The study thus provides a first assessment of youth in Lebanon, with a clear hope to replicate this research in other parts of the Arab world. This report does not aim to provide a comprehensive model testing between levels of analyses, but rather focuses on a more descriptive profiling of such variables in a way that may be useful to policy-makers, businesses, and other social agents interested in this age group.

In order to provide as wide a descriptive of the Lebanese youth as possible, we propose to investigate the following domains: socio-demographic, socio-cultural, and social-psychological profiles.

A. Socio-Demographic Descriptives:

Assessment of socio-demographic variations in the Lebanese youth population should enable us to answer the following questions:

1) How educated are they? Are there differences between groups (gender, sect, region) in education levels?
2) What is the average household income?
3) What are the unemployment rates for this age group?
4) Are they marrying early or is a substantial portion of youth still unwed?

B. Socio-Cultural Orientation:

Internet use:

1) How wide is the internet penetration in this age group?
2) Are there gender, regional, or sectarian differences in internet access and use?

Language use:

1) How proficient are the youth in the use of Arabic, French, and English?
2) Are there gender, regional, or sectarian differences in language proficiency?

Media preferences:

1) Do Lebanese youth prefer Western or Arabic TV programs?
2) Do Lebanese youth prefer Western or Arabic Music?
3) Are there gender, regional or sectarian differences in their media preferences?

Emigration:

1) How many are contemplating emigrating from Lebanon? How many are actually planning to do so?
2) Are there gender, regional or sectarian differences in attitudes towards emigration?

C. Social-Psychological Profiling:

Lebanon’s unique sectarian distribution has been both a curse and a blessing. On the one hand, this “country of minorities” has provided researchers with a wealth of data on intergroup relations, interfaith dialogue and conflict resolution models. On the other hand, this mix of minorities competing for resources has yielded a historical legacy marred by periodic eruptions of armed and bloody conflict. The events following Prime Minister Hariri’s assassination (2005) leading to the Doha Agreement of 2008 are but the latest example. While many researchers often tie eruptions of violence between the communities to regional and international sources, it is the Lebanese themselves that tend to be the perpetrators and victims of their sectarian strife.

It is thus important to assess the perceived relations between members of various sects, with a special emphasis on the degree of sectarian ingroup bias (sectarianism – akin to racism), warmth and acceptance towards other sects (prejudice), attitudes towards inter-sectarian marriage (mixing between the communities), and their degree of religiosity. Further analyses identifying the youth’ identity profile and value orientation would add significantly to our understanding of the guiding principles and self-categorisation processes affecting Lebanese youth today.

I) Inter-Sectarian Relations:

Sectarian ingroup bias (sectarianism):

1) What is the overall level of sectarianism among the youth?
2) Are there differences in sectarianism between the communities?

Warmth towards and acceptance of others (prejudice):

1) Similarly, how warm and accepting are the youth of other sects?
2) Are there differences between groups (gender, sect, region) on prejudice?

Attitudes towards inter-sectarian marriage:

1) What are the youth’ attitudes towards inter-sectarian marriage? Do they support it in general, and would they engage in it personally?
2) Are there differences between groups on attitudes towards inter-sectarian marriage?

Religiosity:

1) Are Lebanese youth religious? Are there differences between the communities, gender or region in levels of religiosity?

ii) Social Identities:

The sectarian dynamics can be tied to the consequences of intergroup dynamics and self-categorisation principles (e.g. Reicher, 2002, 2004; Turner, 1994; Onorato & Turner 2001). The way individuals define themselves (self-categorise) has direct implications for their interaction and perception of others.

Self-categorisation is the cognitive grouping of oneself and some class of stimuli as identical in contrast to some other class of stimuli. This cognitive redefinition of the self from unique attributes and individual differences to shared social category memberships and associated stereotypes produces a “shift towards the perception of self as an interchangeable exemplar of some social category and away from the perception of self as a unique person” (Turner et al., 1987, p. 50). While personal identity is based on interpersonal companions (e.g. “we” versus “not me”), social identity is based on intergroup comparisons (e.g. “us” versus “them”).

Self-categorisation theorists further state that categorisations exist as part of a hierarchical system of classification, forming different levels of abstraction related by means of class inclusion (Turner et al., 1994). The model provided in the figure below illustrate the hierarchical levels of inclusiveness, with categorisations varying from the locale/individuated self, to more relational groups (family and friends), to more collective (political, sectarian etc.) to national and pan regional identities (e.g. Arab world, Islamic umma).

The self-categorisation of individuals has important implications for intergroup dynamics and conflict because of the associated and necessary processes of social comparison (us versus them). For example, if individuals endorse a sectarian group identity, then it is likely that their natural outgroup be another sectarian group. If on the other hand, individuals endorse a national identity, then it is likely that their natural outgroup is another nation. These differences in levels of self-categorisation have direct implications for conflict management (Harb 2007).
The importance of Identities prompts the following questions:

1) What levels of inclusiveness do the Lebanese youth endorse the most?
2) Are the identities relationally defined (family, region) or are they more collectively ascribed (national, par-regional, par-religious etc.)?
3) How strong are national identities compared to sectarian identities? Do these identity preferences differ by youth subgroup?

iii) Values:

Values are frequently used to shed light on the behavior and attitudes of individuals and the functioning of institutions, organizations, and cultures. Schwartz’s (1992, 1994) milestone theory of universals in the content and structure of basic values defined values as: (a) beliefs or concepts; (b) that pertain to desirable behaviors or end states; (c) transcend specific situations; (d) guide the selection or evaluation of events and behavior; and (e) are ordered by relative importance. Schwartz’s Value Survey (1992, 1994) points that the content of each value type is determined by the motivational goal it expresses as a guiding principle in people’s lives. Schwartz (1994) proposed 10 different motivational value types based on the universal requirements of human existence: power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformity, and security (see appendix A for detail).

This set of value types is arranged in a circumplex model that reflects the dynamic relations between them. Actions taken in pursuit of each value type have practical, psychological, and social consequences that conflict with or complement the pursuit of other value types (Sage & Schwartz, 2000). Values in adjacent regions of the model are positively correlated and are conceptually compatible and complementary, but are negatively correlated with an opposite and conflicting set of values on the circumplex model. For example, actions taken in pursuit of independence (self-direction) are likely to conflict with actions intended to express obedience (conformity), but are compatible with actions promoting challenge in life (stimulation). Although the ten value types are considered universal, Schwartz (1992, 1994) did not exclude the emergence of locally important values in specific cultures; for example, values of honor and hospitality are prominent guiding principles in Arab cultures (Feghali, 1997), a suggestion that was empirically supported in samples from Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria (e.g. Harb et al., 2006). These two values (honor and hospitality – henceforth referred to as emic Arab) tend to emerge in between conservation and self-transcendence values in the circumplex model above.

What value hierarchies do the youth endorse?

1) Which values are most important to the youth in Lebanese? Which are the least important?
2) Do these preferences differ by gender, region, or sect?

iv) In Sum:

The present study aims to provide the first nationally representative survey of Lebanese youth on a series of key domains: socio-demographic, socio-cultural, and social-psychological.

Specifically, we address the following questions:

Socio-demographic: how well educated are the youth? What’s the average household income? What are the unemployment rates?
Socio-cultural: what are the youth’s media preference (Western vs. Arabic), what languages do they speak and write, what is the internet penetration in this age group, and what are their attitudes towards emigration?
Social psychological: three sets of social-psychological variables are explored 1) Assessment of inter-sectarian relations 2) exploration of value orientation and 3) exploration of identity hierarchies.

III- METHODOLOGY

A. Instruments:

A battery of measures were developed to assess the three domains of socio-cultural, socio-demographic and social-psychological variables (see Appendix B for the full questionnaire).

Socio-Cultural Measures:

Language use: Six items measuring participants’ declared levels of proficiency in written and spoken Arabic, English and French were developed using 5-point Likert type scales, with 1 indicating low proficiency and 5 high proficiency. Two further items were provided for declaring proficiency in other participant-specified languages.

Media Preferences: two bipolar items measuring participants’ preferences for Western versus Arab TV programs and music were developed. Specifically, participants were asked to choose whether they preferred TV programs and music that were 1) exclusively Western, 2) mostly Western and some Arab, 3) both Western and Arab, 4) mostly Arab and some Western, 5) exclusively Arab content 6) no content at all or 7) other. These items should provide an indication of the socio-cultural orientation of the Lebanese youth through an analysis of their media consumption.

Internet Use: a single item measure the quantitative use of the internet was proposed, with scores ranging from 1) several hours per day to 5) no use at all.

Socio-Demographic Variables:

Inter-sectarian relations: Three measures assessing inter-communal relations in Lebanon were used: sectarian ingroup bias (sectarianism), warmth towards and acceptance of other sects (prejudice), and attitudes towards inter-faith marriage.

Sectarianism: five items measuring sectarian ingroup bias first used in a national survey of Lebanese citizens in 2006 (Harb, Schmidt, & Herstom, 2009) were used in this survey. Sample items include “I am proud to belong to my sect” and “my sect can serve Lebanon better than any other sect,” and were rated on a 5 point Likert type scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). Cronbach Alpha for this scale in the present study is of .85.

Sectarian Prejudice: Haddock et al’s (1993) thermometer was used to assess the participants’ warmth towards and acceptance of other sects. The single item scale has often been used as a measure of prejudice. Participants were asked to report on a scale from 0 to 100 the degree of warmth and acceptance they felt towards other sects in general.

Inter-Sectarian Marriage: two items measuring participants’ attitudes towards inter-sectarian marriage were developed. The first item asked participants for their degree of support for inter-faith marriage on a 5 point Likert type scale ranging from 1 (strongly support) to 5 (strongly opposed). The second item asked participants for their personal willingness to marry someone from a different sect, using a four point forced choice scale ranging from 1) strongly willing to 4) strongly unwilling.

Religiosity:

Five items adapted from Rebeiz & Harb (2010) were used in the present study. These items were selected for their sensitivity and applicability in a culture in which large numbers of Christians and Muslims coexist. Sample items include “I consider myself a religious person,” “My religion influences the way I choose to act in my routine life” and “Prayer to God is one of my usual practices.” Items were rated on a five point Likert type scale, ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).
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Identities:
Thirty-six items measuring eleven different identities were adapted from Harb & Smith (2008) and used in the present study. Sample items and categories are presented in the adjacent figure. The scale items were rated on 5-point Likert type scales, ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). The scale has been validated in nationally representative samples in Iraq and Lebanon (Harb, Fischer, al-Hafedh, 2007; Harb, Schmidt & Hewstone, 2009). Cronbach alpha for the eleven subscales ranged from .68 to .90 in the present study.

Values:
The Basic Human Values Scale (Schwartz, 2002) is a twenty-one item instrument based on Schwartz’s (1992, 1994) universal theory of values. Schwartz’s Value Survey has been validated in over 200 samples from sixty countries around the world (Sagie & Schwartz, 2000). A modified version of Schwartz’s Value Survey has been adopted by the European Social Survey as an instrument measuring value orientations in their thirty-nation surveys (European Social Survey, 2003). We added two additional items to assess the emically derived values of “honour” and “hospitality” that are important in Arab cultures, and asked participants to rate on 5-point Likert scales (i.e. 1 = Very much like me; 5 = Not at all like me) how much a concrete description of a series of persons was like themselves. This scale already existed in the Arabic language, and validated in samples from Lebanon and Iraq.

B. Sampling Procedure:
Information International, a research and survey agency specialised in national polls was contracted to collect the data for this study. Sampling procedure was based on population data retrieved from the Central Administration of Statistics’ report, which lists Lebanese citizens by place of origin rather than by current residency. 1200 Lebanese youth aged 18-25 years old were selected for this survey. Data was collected in the period between December 8 and December 22, 2009, using a multi-stage probability sampling:

Stage 1: selecting neighborhoods inside each city in a way to represent the confessional diversity and makeup of the areas.
Stage 2: selecting households based on a systematic random sample in each neighborhood according to the estimated number of buildings in the neighborhood.
Stage 3: sampling a primary respondent within each household based on the most recent birthday.

C. Sample Descriptives:
1200 Lebanese citizens aged 18-25 participated in this study. The mean age of participants was 21.5 years old (M = 21.5, SD = 2.2), and the gender distribution was slightly skewed in favor of male participants (53% were males, and 47% were females). The general distribution of the sample in terms of sectarian and geographical criteria mimicked national level distributions, with about 75% of the sample consisting of Maronite Christians, Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims. Furthermore, population distribution also indicated that a majority of youth were located between Mount Lebanon and the North.

As such, the sampling procedure and sample descriptives increase confidence in the population validity of this research, with a clear capacity to generalise to the Lebanese Youth population.

2 A call for proposals was sent to six leading survey, marketing and polling agencies in Lebanon.
3 This explains the lower % of participants from Beirut compared to the actual number of residents in Beirut.
4 For a full methodological report, see Information International’s Report, Appendix C.
5 Gender selection difficulties in the North, see Information International’s Report, Appendix C.
6 Note that “Nabatieh” includes: Nabatieh, Marjayoun and Bint Jbeil; “South” includes Saida, Sour, Jezzine; Bekaa includes Zahleh, Baalbeck, and West Bekaa.
RESULTS

A. Socio-Demographic Variables and Characteristics:

Marital Status:
87% of the sample was still single, with only 12% being married. This reinforces reports indicating that youth tend to marry later, as the predominant majority of youth were still single by age 25.

Education:
The education distribution of Lebanese youth confirmed previous reports indicating a noticeably educated population. The large number of participants with a university degree (approximately 41.4%) contrasts sharply with all other regional indices and even international ones (e.g., US Census Bureau Report estimated that 24% of the US population has a Bachelor’s degree). This level of highly educated population corroborates previous national studies that found that 32.7% of the general Lebanese population held a university degree (Habib, Schmidt & Hewstone, 2009).

Further statistical analyses did not indicate differences in education across groups. In other words, education permeates youth in Lebanon regardless of gender, sect or region.

Income and Employment:
90% of youth reported household earnings below $2000 (US) per month, with a large majority of youth (58.3%) reporting household earnings between $500 and $1500 (US).

Further statistical analyses indicated significant disparities in declared household income by region, with both Bint Jbeil and Aakar displaying lower household incomes than all other regions. There were no gender differences in household income.

37.3% of the youth reported being employed, and 61.8% reported unemployment. However, the majority of unemployed youth are students, with only 7% reporting no employment.

B. Socio-Cultural Assessment

Internet Use:
Contrary to previous estimates indicating low internet penetration in Arab populations, almost half of the Lebanese youth indicated using the internet on a daily basis (49.7%), and only 18.5% indicated no internet use whatsoever.

Further statistical analyses indicated significant gender differences with male participants using the internet more than female participants (except in the Druze community, where females stated using the internet significantly more than males). Regional differences did emerge, with higher internet usage in Mount Lebanon than in both the Bekaa and Nabatieh. Further analyses indicate that the Caza of Dinnieh, Baalbeck, Nabatieh, Aakar, Saida and Zahleh have the least internet penetration. These differences in regional access to the internet may explain the significantly higher level of internet access among Maronite Christians compared to Sunni and Shia Muslims.

Language Use:
The multilingual use of Arabic, English and French in the Lebanese population is well noted. The present data indicates that Lebanese youth do in fact claim to control more than one language: 88.3% of participants stated control of written Arabic (to a large or very large extent), 41.3% controlling written English and 28.9% written French. Similar levels are expressed in their verbal/oral control of Arabic, English and French (92.9%, 43.1% and 31.2% respectively). 7.1% of participants stated speaking languages other than the three stated above.

In other words, almost all Lebanese youth spoke and wrote Arabic, almost half spoke English and a third spoke French. The lower ranking and score for the French language is noteworthy considering that French is the second official language of Lebanon. Further analyses indicated that more women than men spoke French (no other gender differences emerged), and participants from the Caza of Baabda spoke French more than any other Caza.

Media Preferences:
When participants were asked about their preferred media source (e.g. whether they preferred Western or Arab TV programs and music), a quarter of participants declared a clear preference for Western media (25%) and music (21.7%), a quarter declared selecting both Western and Arab media equally, and the remainder preferred predominantly Arab media (46% for both Arab TV programs and Arab Music).

These media use preferences are indicative of a peculiar diffusion of cultural patterns, with significant differences in terms of Western penetration per youth group: statistical analyses indicated that some Christian minorities (e.g. Maronite, Orthodox and Armenian) were less oriented towards Arab media than some of their Muslim counterparts (e.g. Sunni and Shia). Only the Armenian youth community seemed to indicate a preference favouring Western programs over Arabic ones.
Attitudes Towards Emigration:

A full quarter of participants indicated their intention to emigrate, both through measures of attitudes towards emigration and active behaviour in seeking to do so. It is striking that a quarter of Lebanese youth are seeking to emigrate and a further fifth is thinking about it. Almost half of the Lebanese youth were contemplating better prospects elsewhere.

Interestingly, statistical analyses indicate patterns of behaviour that are not consistent with political narratives in Lebanon, in that there were no sectarian differences or regional differences in intention to emigrate – only gender differences emerged, with males expressing greater intention to emigrate than female Lebanese participants. In other words, the problem of emigration is not restricted to a particular sect or even a geographical location.

C. Psycho-Social Assessment:

Measures of Inter-Communal Relations:

A set of three measures were used to assess inter-sectarian relations: Sectarian Ingroup Bias (Sectarianism), Warmth towards other sects (prejudice), and attitudes towards interfaith marriage (a more indirect and applied assessment of inter-confessional relations).

Sectarianism:

The Lebanese youth expressed a good deal of sectarianism, with an overall average of 3.78 (SD = 1.8) out of 5. This blatant bias towards one’s sect is not differentiated by gender, confession or region. In other words, the Lebanese youth, regardless of gender, confession or region of origin expressed similarly high levels of sectarianism.

Warmth and Acceptance:

When asked about the degree of warmth and acceptance individuals felt towards members of other sects, participants responded with a relatively lukewarm response, averaging 67% acceptance, but with a large standard deviation (SD = 19.7).

Further statistical analyses indicated no gender or sectarian differences in expressed warmth and acceptance, but significant regional differences with the Bekaa and the South expressing significantly more warmth and acceptance, while Nabatieh expressed significantly less.

Attitudes Towards Interfaith Marriage:

Participants were asked about the extent to which they would support interfaith marriage, and to which extent they were willing to wed someone from a different sect then theirs. As the adjacent figures indicate, about 33% were opposed, 26% neutral and 41% in favour of interfaith marriage. When participants were asked to state whether they were willing to marry someone from a different sect, only 37% stated willing to do so, while 63% stated their unwillingness. In other words, only about a third of participants where committed to interfaith marriage, and a third was strongly opposed. Furthermore, about a quarter of participants swung between neutral acceptance for others and non-acceptance for the self.

Further statistical analyses revealed significant gender and regional differences, but no sectarian differences. Specifically, participants from the North expressed more negative attitudes towards interfaith marriage than participants from other regions (specifically Mount Lebanon and the Bekaa), but did not differ from other regions in their rejection of personal interfaith marriage.

On the other hand, there was a strong main effect for gender, whereby female participants were significantly less inclined to support interfaith marriage and consider interfaith marriage compared to male participants.

Religiosity:

Participants indicated moderately high levels of religiosity, with an average of 3.4 (SD = .84) on a 5 point scale. Further analyses indicated that both Sunni and Shia Muslims exhibited significantly higher levels of religiosity than all other sects. No other gender or regional differences emerged. Further descriptive analyses indicate that participants from the Caza of Zgharta and Aley were the least religious, while participants from the Caza of Nabatieh were the most religious.

Social Identities:

An exploration of the social identities of Lebanese youth shows the following:

The most highly endorsed self-categorisation is the family, closely followed by national identification. Sectarian/religious identification comes third. The identification pattern displayed below also indicates low concern with a private unique self-identification, and no political identification. These identity patterns reflect the wider culture in which family dynamics and inter-communal relations dominate the identification process, with little space for individual differentiation or political affiliations.

The low score in endorsing Arab and Islamic identities is due to the aggregation of Muslim and Christian scores. Both Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims endorsed Islamic identities highly, almost on par with sectarian identification. Arab identification was lower than Islamic identification in both groups.

Further analyses indicate no differences between genders on any of the identity dimensions, but significant differences between sects and regions. Specifically, Maronite Christians identified with their family, friends, and profession significantly more than both Sunni and Shia Muslims. Sunni and Shia participants scored significantly higher than Maronite Christians on Arab identity and...
higher than all other sects on Islamic identity. There were no differences between sects on sectarian identification, indicating that all endorsed their sectarian identities equally. Furthermore, regional differences did emerge with North Lebanon participants reporting higher sectarian identification than Mount Lebanon, higher nationalism scores than Mount Lebanon, South and Nabatieh, and lower scores on a global humanity dimension than most other regions. Mount Lebanon participants also scored significantly higher on individualism than the Bekaa, North or Beirut.

Values:

An exploration of value hierarchies indicate value preferences that are not usually associated with “youth”, in that Arab emic values (honor, hospitality) and values that transcend the self (e.g. benevolence and universalism) were ranked highest.

A closer inspection of the ranking of the eleven value types indicates the prominence of Arab emic values, closely followed by the values of security, achievement and self-direction. The least preferred values were stimulation, hedonism, tradition and power. These results may indicate a possible violation of the Circumplex model. These value hierarchies seem to indicate an achievement motivated and driven youth, that seem to be less interested in hedonistic and stimulation oriented values. This contrasts with the more conventional expectations associated with the younger generation, but not necessarily from findings derived from student samples in Schwartz’s multinational studies. While the least preferred values in this sample are highly similar to the least preferred values in international samples (Schwartz & Bardi, 2001), it is the most highly endorsed values that diverge from international samples. Specifically, and most importantly, Lebanese youth placed less emphasis on benevolence and universalism values than other international samples. This is important since since emic values (benevolence) and positive values directed towards the larger community (universalism) are essential in establishing and maintaining positive communal relations. These are the values that capture idealism and strong concern with the well-being of the community and the environment.

Concluding Comments

This is the first nationally representative survey that empirically assesses the socio-demographic, socio-cultural and social-psychological profile of Lebanese youth. The large sample size (N = 1200) and the systematic investigation of identity preferences and value hierarchies add credence to the present report.

A. Main Findings:

This research has revealed a substantial set of information in socio-demographic, socio-cultural and social-psychological domains that may be useful to policy makers or businesspersons interested in this age group. Specifically, we noted that:

The Lebanese youth are significantly educated, with over 41% of the population holding a university degree. Importantly, there was no gender, regional or sectarian differences in education levels, indicating an equal diffusion of education levels across regions and sects. This unique population characteristic is one of the most important assets available to Lebanon’s governing authorities. A closer inspection of the socio-demographic variables also indicates that:

1) The Lebanese government has at its disposal one of the most educated populations in the region, an asset that can easily compete with other sources of wealth the government taps into.

2) The low household income and high intentions to emigrate indicate that this resource is not utilised adequately by authorities, and is turning our qualified youth into an export commodity. Any government would be alarmed when half its youth (regardless of regional or sectarian affiliation) is considering emigrating.

3) The present findings also contradict sectarian reports of differential emigration patterns: emigration intention is not affecting one specific community or region more than any other. These findings are indicative of a more systemic rather than group specific problem in addressing the emigration and brain drain problems plaguing the country.

The present study also indicates some peculiar socio-cultural orientation. Lebanese youth reinforce a common perception of a multi-cultural Lebanon; while Arabic remains the predominant language, the present study found significant inlays of both English and French within this age group. Almost half of the sample expressed proficient use of English, and almost a third expressed proficiency in French.

Language proficiency is closely associated with exposure to foreign cultures, a fact that is mirrored by the youth’s media consumption preferences. The present study showed that half the Lebanese youth prefer Arabic music and TV programs, a quarter preferred mostly Western media, and a further quarter mixed the two. On the other hand, these results indicate a substantial amount of cultural variation and diversity, on the other hand, the results also indicate a significantly heterogeneous population with potentially irreconcilable orientation differences. More research is needed to explore whether these multicultural orientations are detrimental to the Lebanese social fabric or are a source of added wealth.

B. Inter-Sectarian Relations, Identities and Values:

Analyses of inter-sectarian relations indicate a rather negative profile. Lebanese youth reported high levels of sectarian bias (ingroup favouritism), average to mild levels of warmth and acceptance towards other sects, and low levels of acceptance of inter-sectarian relationships. Specifically:

1) A third of participants expressed negative emotions towards, and low acceptance of, other sects (hostile prejudice)

2) Two thirds of the youth would not consider marrying someone from a different sect

3) 80% of participants scored higher than the midpoint on sectarian ingroup bias

These results indicate a high urgency in addressing these inter-sectarian relations, especially when we consider that these results are emerging from the youth stratum of the population. While the scores are not completely polarised (e.g. ceiling effects), they indicate a population readiness for sectarian strife that transcends gender or sectarian differences.

These results are further compounded by the identity analysis we reported above. Lebanese youth show clear family and national identities, closely followed by sectarian affiliation. In other words, Lebanese youth are significantly concerned for and identify with their family, community and the environment.
with their families, Lebanon and their sect. These results are relatively surprising considering the population surveyed: youth generally associate with their peers, and value their individuality; this was not the case in Lebanon. Importantly, there were no differences between sect or sectarian identification, indicating that no community emerged as more sectarian than any other. However, regional differences did emerge with North Lebanon participants reporting higher sectarian identification than Mount Lebanon, higher nationalism scores than Mount Lebanon, South and Nabatieh, and lower scores on a global humanity dimension than most other regions. Mount Lebanon participants also scored significantly higher on individualism than the Bekaa, North or Beirut. A lower level of analysis focused on sect and cities is needed to identify locations with differential patterns of identification and that would require a more focused intervention to avoid further polarisation of scores.

Interestingly, Islamic identification pruned over Arab identification for both Sunni Muslims and Shia Muslims. In other words, the Muslim identity trumps pan-Arabian, in contrast with the stipulated preferences of the mid 1950s and 1970s. This religious orientation is further substantiated by measures of religiosity, whereby 67 % of Lebanese youth indicated being religious (average score above the midpoint).

This profile is further reinforced by the value hierarchies that emerged in the sample: Lebanese youth indicated a clear preference for the emically derived values (honor and hospitality), closely followed by values of self-transcendence. As in other countries featuring social unrest (e.g. Iraq), the Lebanese youth also highly values security, indicating their concern for stable social relations and conditions. Lebanese youth did not espouse values of hedonism and stimulation, values that are generally thought to be associated with youth in some cultures; they seemed more focused on achievement and self-direction (independence of thought and action). Importantly, Lebanese youth also showed moderate endorsement of benevolence and universalism, values that are central in cementing communal relations (careg for members of the community and the environment). There were no sectarian differences in endorsing benevolence and universalism, but some regional differences did emerge, especially between Mount Lebanon, the North and the South. Mount Lebanon scored significantly higher on universalism than the North, and significantly lower on benevolence than the South.

In sum, a relatively intriguing picture of Lebanese youth emerged from this study: on the one hand, youth expressed similar levels of affiliation to family and sect, similar levels of prejudice and sectarianism, and similar levels of education, income and intentions to emigrate. On the other hand, differences did emerge between youth groups (sects or regions) on associated variables related to identification, cultural orientation and values. There were greater differences between regions than between sects, a finding that might help policy makers identify specific locations for targeted interventions. Findings associated with the North, Mount Lebanon, and the South/Nabatieh show value and identity discrepancies that warrant attention and further investigation: Values, identities and inter-communal relations are not immutable and do change over time. Policy makers could benefit from the mapping of findings to devise strategies to decrease inter-communal tensions and reinforce positive communal relations.

C. Further Comments and Recommendations:

It is important to note that the present report only skims the surface of the data collected, providing a rather descriptive report of Lebanese youth, and using relatively simple ‘2x6 factorial analyses of variance’. More sophisticated model testing analyses and a further exploration of the inter-relationships between the variables would shed further light on the situation of youth in Lebanon (forthcoming).

Furthermore, the present research constitutes a one-time snapshot of the conditions of youth in Lebanon, and as such is not able to determine developmental trends across the measured variables. For example, are Islamic identities on the rise or have they reached their peak? Are media preferences shifting towards more Arab or more Western content? Are inter-sectarian relations getting worse or better over time? As such, it would be important to conduct a similar study three to five years later, in order to obtain a more dynamic and multidimensional image of the socio-demographic, socio-cultural and social-psychological developments of youth.

The study would also benefit from comparisons with relevant “control groups,” whether data from the larger adult population of the same country, or comparisons groups from other Arab-countries. Such comparisons would enable a better understanding of the relation between variables, and enable a better mapping of youth profiles across groups.

Finally, this research hopefully constitutes a first step in the empirical exploration of youth dynamics and profiles across the Arab region. The wealth of information and policy recommendations that such data could generate is invaluable to policy makers concerned with the Arab world, and would provide a more comprehensive picture of Arab social reality.

References


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Statistical analyses included 2x6 factorial ANOVAs and MANOVAs, with gender (male, female), Sect (Armenian Orthodox, Christian Maronite, Christian Orthodox, Druze, Muslim Shia and Muslim Sunni), and Governorate (Bekaa, Beirut, Mount Lebanon, Nabatieh, North and South) as between factors. The analysis was conducted with few sects (the six with the largest number of constituents and across the religious spectrum) and at the Mohafaza level to ensure a minimum level of participants per cell and minimise variance errors.
Appendices

Appendix A: Definition of the 10 Value Types

- Self-Direction: Independent thought and action.
- Stimulation: Excitement, novelty and challenge in life.
- Hedonism: Pleasure or sensuous gratification for oneself.
- Achievement: Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards.
- Power: Central goal is attainment of social status and prestige and control or dominance over people and resources.
- Conformity: Restraint of actions, inclinations and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms.
- Tradition: Respect, commitment, and acceptance of the customs and ideas of others that one's culture or religion imposes on the individual.
- Universalism: Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact.
- Emic values: values identified as important in Arab region, such as hospitality, honour, chivalry, etc.

Appendix B: Questionnaire

Questions about the Lebanese youth in the Arab world.

- General information about the study.
- Participation is voluntary, and your answers will be kept confidential.
- The research team will not share any of your personal information.

For any questions or concerns, please contact the research team at 01-350000 ext. 4914 or isalti@aub.edu.lb.

Thank you for your participation.
إرشادات:

فإذا كنتم أنت نائلين للإجابة على أسئلة عديدة، فربما تجدون أن هناك بعض التوقيتات تتعلق بالجديد. استخدموا مقياس النقاط الخمس المدرج أدناه للإجابة على كل سؤال.

1. إن أكثر ما يحدد هويتي هو:

أ. عائلتي/أهلي
ب. أصدقائي
ج. حزبي السياسي
د. مهنتي/اختصاصي
ه. بلدتي أو منطقتي
و. طائفتي
ز. لبنان
ح. العالم العربي
ط. الأمة الإسلامية
ي. الإنسانية بشكل عام
ل. غيره،

لا يوجد

2. يهتم بالأفكار الجديدة وبأن يكون خلاياً. يحب القيام بالأمور على طريقته الخاصة:

أ. عائلتي/أهلي
ب. أصدقائي
ج. حزبي السياسي
د. مهنتي/اختصاصي
ه. بلدتي أو منطقتي
و. طائفتي
ز. لبنان
ح. العالم العربي
ط. الأمة الإسلامية
ي. الإنسانية بشكل عام
ل. غيره،

لا يوجد

3. إن ولائي هو:

أ. عائلتي/أهلي
ب. أصدقائي
ج. حزبي السياسي
د. مهنتي/اختصاصي
ه. بلدتي أو منطقتي
و. أهل طائفتي
ز. لبنان
ح. العالم العربي
ط. الأمة الإسلامية
ي. الإنسانية بشكل عام
ل. غيره،

لا يوجد

4. كم يشبهك هذا الشخص؟

أ. عائلتي/أهلي
ب. أصدقائي
ج. حزبي السياسي
د. مهنتي/اختصاصي
ه. بلدتي أو منطقتي
و. طائفتي
ز. لبنان
ح. العالم العربي
ط. الأمة الإسلامية
ي. الإنسانية بشكل عام
ل. غيره،

لا يوجد

لا يوجد

لا يوجد

لا يوجد

كم يشبهك هذا الشخص؟

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

7. يملك ثقة بقدرته ويعمل بجد لتحقيق الأهداف. يريد أن يحترم الناس ويعزز بيئته. يؤمن أن البيئة مهمة بالنسبة له.

8. يحب المشاركة في الأنشطة الأثرية. يود أن يساهم في جمع الأشياء المهمة.

9. يهتم بالتعليم والتعلم في جميع المجالات حتى في حالة عدم القدرة على الفهم.

10. يتأمل أنه من الأفضل أن يكون قادراً على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى. يعتقد أنه من الأفضل القيام بالأمور على الطريقة التي تلائم الأضواء.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

11. يحب أن يدخل في المحادثات الصعبة. يحب أن يشارك في التفاوض والنقاشات.

12. يهتم بالتعليم والتعلم في جميع المجالات حتى في حالة عدم القدرة على الفهم.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

13. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

14. يحب أن يكون جيدًا في الأغراض، ويحب أن يكون قادرًا على تحسين الأشياء.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

15. يحب الشرق ويعمل بجد لتحقيق الأهداف. يريد أن يحترم الناس ويعزز بيئته. يؤمن أن البيئة مهمة بالنسبة له.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

16. يملك ثقة بقدرته ويعمل بجد لتحقيق الأهداف. يريد أن يحترم الناس ويعزز بيئته. يؤمن أن البيئة مهمة بالنسبة له.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

17. يحب أن يدخل في المحادثات الصعبة. يحب أن يشارك في التفاوض والنقاشات.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

18. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

19. يحب أن يدخل في المحادثات الصعبة. يحب أن يشارك في التفاوض والنقاشات.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

20. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

21. يحب أن يدخل في المحادثات الصعبة. يحب أن يشارك في التفاوض والنقاشات.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

22. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

23. يحب أن يدخل في المحادثات الصعبة. يحب أن يشارك في التفاوض والنقاشات.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

24. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

25. يحب أن يدخل في المحادثات الصعبة. يحب أن يشارك في التفاوض والنقاشات.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

26. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

27. يحب أن يدخل في المحادثات الصعبة. يحب أن يشارك في التفاوض والنقاشات.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

28. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

29. يحب أن يدخل في المحادثات الصعبة. يحب أن يشارك في التفاوض والنقاشات.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

30. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

31. يحب أن يدخل في المحادثات الصعبة. يحب أن يشارك في التفاوض والنقاشات.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

32. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

33. يحب أن يدخل في المحادثات الصعبة. يحب أن يشارك في التفاوض والنقاشات.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

34. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

35. يحب أن يدخل في المحادثات الصعبة. يحب أن يشارك في التفاوض والنقاشات.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

36. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

37. يحب أن يدخل في المحادثات الصعبة. يحب أن يشارك في التفاوض والنقاشات.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

38. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

39. يحب أن يدخل في المحادثات الصعبة. يحب أن يشارك في التفاوض والنقاشات.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا

40. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى. يعتقد أنه من الضروري أن يكون قادرًا على التفكير على الطريقة المثلى.

إلى حد ما لا

إلى حد كبير جداً

إلى حد لا
مند عرض في التلفزيون، غالباً ما أفضل متابعة مجموعات ترفيهية فقط
1. موسيقى غربية فقط
2. موسيقى غربية غالباً ومغربية أحياناً
3. موسيقى غربية وموسيقى منبثقة بشكل متساو
4. موسيقى مغربية فقط
5. لا أشاهد التلفزيون

. إلى أي نوع من الموسيقى تستمع؟
1. موسيقى غربية فقط
2. موسيقى غربية غالباً ومغربية أحياناً
3. موسيقى غربية ومغربية بشكل متساو
4. موسيقى مغربية فقط
5. لا أستمع إلى الموسيقى

. كم من أصدقائك يعيشون في الحي/المنطقة
1. 50% أو أكثر
2. 25% - 50%
3. 0% - 25%

. كم من أصدقائك يشاركونك هواياتك؟
1. 50% أو أكثر
2. 25% - 50%
3. 0% - 25%

. كم من أصدقائك هم من طائفتك؟
1. 50% أو أكثر
2. 25% - 50%
3. 0% - 25%

. كم من أصدقائك هم من طائفتك؟
1. 50% أو أكثر
2. 25% - 50%
3. 0% - 25%

. هل تعتقد أن هناك تباين أو اختلاف بين كودك لبنانيًا؟
1. هل تعتقد أن هناك تباين بين كودك لبنانيًا؟
2. هل تعتقد أن هناك اختلاف بين كودك لبنانيًا وتوجهاتك؟
3. هل تعتقد أن هناك اختلاف بين كودك لبنانيًا ومواقف شخصية مغربية؟

. أعتقد أن هناك تباين بين كودك لبنانيًا ووجهاتك.
1. أعتقد أن هناك تباين بين كودك لبنانيًا ووجهاتك.
2. أعتقد أن هناك اختلاف بين كودك لبنانيًا ووجهاتك.
3. أعتقد أن هناك اختلاف بين كودك لبنانيًا ووجهاتك.

. هل تشعر أن هناك تباين بين كودك لبنانيًا ووجودك مغربية؟
1. هل تشعر أن هناك تباين بين كودك لبنانيًا ووجودك مغربية؟
2. هل تشعر أن هناك اختلاف بين كودك لبنانيًا ووجودك مغربية؟
3. هل تشعر أن هناك اختلاف بين كودك لبنانيًا ووجودك مغربية؟

. هل تشعر أن هناك تباين بين كودك لبنانيًا ووجودك مغربية؟
1. هل تشعر أن هناك تباين بين كودك لبنانيًا ووجودك مغربية؟
2. هل تشعر أن هناك اختلاف بين كودك لبنانيًا ووجودك مغربية؟
3. هل تشعر أن هناك اختلاف بين كودك لبنانيًا ووجودك مغربية؟

. هل تشعر أن هناك تباين بين كودك لبنانيًا ووجودك مغربية؟
1. هل تشعر أن هناك تباين بين كودك لبنانيًا ووجودك مغربية؟
2. هل تشعر أن هناك اختلاف بين كودك لبنانيًا ووجودك مغربية؟
3. هل تشعر أن هناك اختلاف بين كودك لبنانيًا ووجودك مغربية؟

. هل تشعر أن هناك تباين بين كودك لبنانيًا ووجودك مغربية؟
1. هل تشعر أن هناك تباين بين كودك لبنانيًا ووجودك مغربية؟
2. هل تشعر أن هناك اختلاف بين كودك لبنانيًا ووجودك مغربية؟
3. هل تشعر أن هناك اختلاف بين كودك لبنانيًا ووجودك مغربية؟
17. How do you feel towards the other confessions? Use the scale below which range from 0 to 100.

> No problem at all. A score of 0 means you feel more comfortable and welcomed. A lower score means you feel more cold and less welcomed.

1. Armenian Catholic
2. Armenian Orthodox
3. Baptist
4. Druse
5. Sunni
6. Shi’ite
7. Shia
8. protestant
9. Catholic
10. Catholic

18. What is your opinion on the difference between being Lebanese and being of your own confession?

19. What is the percentage of Lebanese who are of your confession?

20. How do you think the confessions of the population are seen compared to the Lebanese ideal?

21. To what extent do you think there is a difference or a change between the characteristics of your own religion and your own personality?

22. Considering your age, education, and income, do you think that there is a difference or a change between the characteristics of your own religion and your own personality?
Appendix C: Information International Methodology Report

I. Sample Description

1,200 questionnaires were collected for the purpose of the Youth's Identities and Values Survey in Lebanon. The distribution of questionnaires per Mohafaza for the specific ages 18-25 years is detailed in table 1. This distribution is adopted based on the Central Administration of Statistics' report, "The National Survey of Household Living Conditions 2007 – Lebanon".

Table 1: Distribution of Questionnaires per Mohafaza

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mohafaza</th>
<th># of Questionnaires</th>
<th>% of Questionnaires</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Beirut</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mount Lebanon</td>
<td>440</td>
<td>36.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Lebanon</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>21.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Lebanon</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beqaa</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nabateh</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The questionnaires covered the 26 relevant districts, including the capital city in each as well as other towns/villages in order to maintain the confessional representation of the sample.

The field work started on December 8, 2009 and ended on December 22, 2009.

22 field workers were employed for the purpose of this survey. However, four of them stopped working after 2-3 days of field work due to the difficulty in the methodology of finding the youth respondents, mainly during the day (before noon till afternoon).

The sample consisted of 53.3% males and 46.7% females.

The age distribution of the respondents is detailed in table 2.

Table 2: Age Distribution of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18-19</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-24</td>
<td>762</td>
<td>63.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The distribution of respondents by educational level is shown in table 3.

Table 3: Distribution of the Educational Level Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Educational Level</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elementary and Below</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediate</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>25.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vocational Studies</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>16.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>University</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>41.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Graduate Studies</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused to answer</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

87.2% of surveyed respondents are single, 12% married and 0.6% divorced. 0.3% refused to report their social status.

The confessional distribution of respondents is detailed in table 4.

Table 4: Confessional Distribution of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confession</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Maronite</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orthodox</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armenian Orthodox/Armenian Catholic</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>25.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shia'a</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>22.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Druze</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alawite</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minorities</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As for the occupational status of the surveyed respondents, 47.9% are students, 6.4% housewives, and 7.2% unemployed while 38.3% reported to work.

Finally, 34.3% of surveyed respondents reported to have a family monthly income of $US 500-$US 1,000, followed by 22.1% whose monthly family income ranges between $US 1,000-$US 1,500. The detailed Monthly Household Income distribution is detailed in table 5.
II. Methodology

As specified in the proposal, Information International adopted a multi-stage probability sampling to ensure a random, representative sample for identifying households and main respondents. The first stage consisted of selecting neighborhoods inside each selected city in a way to represent the confessional diversity and make-up of the areas. The second stage consisted of selecting households based on a systematic random sample in each selected neighborhood according to the estimated number of buildings in the neighborhood, and finally the third stage consisted of sampling a primary respondent within each household based on the most recent birthday.

The interviewer asked about the total number of adults aged 18-25 years living in the household, and chose the one with the most recent birthday (at the date of the interview) to be the main respondent. If the selected person was not at home, the present household members were asked about the potential time of availability of the relevant respondent and a potential appointment was fixed to avoid waste of time and effort. A follow-up up to two times was conducted before declaring a non response. If the selected respondent accepted to participate in the survey, he was explained the objectives of the survey and handed the questionnaire for him/her to fill in, after being reassured that the questionnaire is voluntary, anonymous and confidential.

However, the difficulty in finding the respondents at their households during the day time (morning till afternoon) - as most of them were either at school, university or work- imposed some modifications on the methodology as follows:

1) When approaching a selected household that includes a person aged between 18-25 years who is not present at home at the time of the interview, and if it is indicated by the present household members that this person works in a nearby shop/store, the field workers went to interview the relevant respondent at his place of work.

2) In some cases where selected respondents found difficulties in reading the questionnaire, mainly in cases of low educational level or difficulties in reading formal Arabic, field workers were given the permission of conducting the interview with these respondents (reading to them the questions), after agreeing on this issue with the Client.

3) In some areas such as Bcharri, Jezzine and Habaya where it was very difficult to find youth respondents in these areas as most work or study in Tripoli, Beirut or other cities, and do not come back to their homes daily, the methodology was modified to choose the youth respondent available at the selected household if applicable, if the potential respondent based on the last birthday method was not available because of this specified reason.

4) In certain Southern areas, mainly in Bint Jbeil, where it was very difficult to circulate freely, some neighborhoods could not be visited as they are under high military control. The same applies to some neighborhoods in Beirut Southern Suburbs.

Table 5: Monthly Household Income Distribution of Respondents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Confession</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than $200</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$201-$500</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$501-$1,000</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>34.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,001-$1,500</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>22.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$1,501-$2,000</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>13.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2,001-$3,000</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$3,001-$5,000</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>More than $5,000</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Refused to answer</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

III. Problems in the Field

The following notes were raised during the implementation of the survey, detailed below as follows:

1) The target group of the survey (youth aged 18-25 years) was very difficult to reach during daytime, as they are either at school, university or work. Efforts were doubled starting early afternoon until late evening in order to be able to find the relevant respondents at home.

2) Around 33% of cases necessitated a second follow up as the relevant respondent was not at home at the time of the interview.

3) The lack of availability of youth in some areas such as Bcharri and Jezzine during the week was a major problem in those areas, where most youth in these areas work in main cities and most do not come back to their homes daily.

4) In some cases where the household head was present at the house at the time of the interview, he refused to adopt the technique of choosing the household youth member whose birthday comes next-especially if it happened to be a female respondent- and insisted that the interview be conducted with him, being the responsible for his family and the speaker in the name of the household. It took the interviewers a lot of effort to convince them of the scientific importance of this methodology and the need to respect the adopted technique.

5) The cultural factors constituted a problem in some areas as in Tripoli and Mhineh-Dinnih where female selected respondents were not allowed to participate in the survey in the presence of a male brother who falls into the requested age category (18-25 years). This may explain in part the higher number of males in each of these two areas.

6) Several questions were raised by the respondents regarding the religion/confession questions, where the concentration on such issues was questioned rather on other issues related to the youth.

7) As mentioned previously, in Bint Jbeil, it was very difficult to circulate freely. That is why some neighborhoods could not be visited as they are under high military control. The same applies to some neighborhoods in Beirut Southern Suburbs.

8) In Nabatieh, the field work team was stopped. After initiating personal contacts with the people in charge in the area there, the field work team was allowed to continue the survey.

9) 1,385 respondents were approached in order to fill in 1,700 completed questionnaires. As a result, the refusal rate reached 13.3%.

10) The reasons reported for refusing to participate in the survey varied as follow:
    a. No interest in this kind of surveys
    b. No time (especially related to the questionnaire length)
    c. Specific concentration on religious/sectarian issues (this reason was mainly reported by respondents who accepted at first to participate in the survey but then changed their mind after scanning through the questionnaire).